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When I started brainstorming for this issue, I was troubled by theextensive national media coverage of a recall election for a trial judgein California, Judge Aaron Persky. I was frustrated that the large vol-
ume of coverage had so few facts regarding Judge Persky or the already infa-
mous sentencing decision that underlay the recall effort. While judicial
accountability is critical to the credibility of our courts, I was also alarmed by
the lack of any coherent communal standards for evaluating whether to recall
a judge in our national dialogue. The plan for this issue resulted. We had no
idea that the Kavanaugh hearings and the national attention to the Larry Nas-
sar sentencing would only further spotlight community evaluation of judicial
officers. How should we judge the judges, and how do we balance the need for
impartiality with the need for accountability? 
First, we hear from an accomplished lawyer and gifted former journalist, Jeff
Hunt. His article gives us the facts we wanted to hear behind the Persky recall.
Not surprisingly, the situation raised more
challenges, regardless of your perspective, than
the media coverage suggested. 
In our second article, Justice Barbara Pari-
ente and Melanie Kalmanson give us frontline
accounts of efforts to “send a message” to
judges. They discuss the dangers of a judiciary
too beholden to popular will and make a case
for that apparently passé notion of judicial
independence. They also explain objective
standards for evaluation of judges.
In our third article, we turn to the other side
of the spectrum. Prof. James Gibson and
Michael Nelson discuss the critical importance
of accountability to the credibility of the judi-
ciary and the risk of being known as The Least Accountable Branch. The authors
question the premise that judges should be insulated from the views of the
community. They discuss the scope of judicial discretion and question how a
judiciary can be accountable if the subjective exercise of that discretion is effec-
tively deemed unreviewable.
Our fourth article from Prof. Jordan Singer provides a broader perspective on
the relative roles of accountability and independence for the judiciary. Prof.
Singer reviews some history of our attempts in judicial selection systems to bal-
ance these sometimes competing elements. In his list of sample retention chal-
lenges, you could add one in my state of Colorado last year. A highly regarded
trial judge made a ruling that a powerful civil attorney disliked and the attor-
ney funded an advertising campaign against him that our nonpartisan, merit-
based system was not equipped to handle. He was retained so, like other exam-
ples cited by Prof. Jordan, you may see that as an example of the strength of the
current system or a cautionary tale of troubles to come.
Finally, I provide an essay reminding us of a time when the judiciary really
was no more than a reflection of the popular prejudices of the day and how
some of those influences are still with us. While tied to our topic, my essay is
intended more to follow the advice of our psychology experts from issue 54:2
to be mindful of the purpose and value in our work.—David Prince
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Dear colleagues and Court Review readers!
The State of State Courts is an annual national survey con-
ducted on behalf of the National Center for State Courts, and I
thought it would be interesting to share the poll results and
analysis as we focus on critical issues facing our respective judi-
ciaries. In addition to NCSC ‘s regular tracking measures, this
year’s research also examined three areas identified by NCSC’s
advisory group as critical issues facing state courts across the
country: cash bail reform, self-represented litigants, and online
dispute resolution. 
Overall views toward state courts have held steady, and in a
few cases improved, despite a year of “widespread political
attacks on judges, campaign accusations of special interest
influence on the court system, and increasingly
partisan battles over judicial elections and nomi-
nations.” Since tracking began in 2012, voter
confidence and trust in the state courts reached a
new high, with governors and state legislatures
ratings falling well below the courts.
Nevertheless, there are still concerns of bias,
inefficiency, and a two-tiered justice system
weighted against “regular” people. Mistrust of the
courts runs high with African-American voters,
who are least likely to agree the courts are unbi-
ased in their case decision (37% agree, 59% dis-
agree) and are taking the needs of people into account (41% agree,
56% disagree). There is a large gap between white and African-
American voters on the system being fair and impartial (white:
66% describes, AA: 36% describes) and providing equal justice
for all (white: 56% describes, AA: 29% describes). Voters, par-
ticularly non-white voters, believe more can be done by judges
to understand the needs of those in their courtrooms. Con-
cerning the critical issues identified by the advisory group, a
majority recognizes that cash bail produces a two-tiered justice
system, and the public strongly believes that judges should
base pretrial release decisions on factors other than ability to
pay. A broad majority also say courts are not doing enough for
self-represented litigants, but there is trepidation in navigating
the court system without an attorney. Online dispute resolution
has some attractiveness as a cost-effective way to resolve
smaller cases. Not surprisingly, younger voters with a higher
educational attainment or incomes are more likely to opt for an
online resource over the courthouse.
The combative and partisan confirmation hearings for Jus-
tice Brett Kavanaugh appear to have affected the public’s confi-
dence in the United States Supreme Court along party lines
according to the NCSC survey. The Kavanaugh hearings and
other recent events (#MeToo) also highlighted concerns about
inappropriate conduct within the judicial branch that was the
focus of another report, the 2018 Year-End Report on the Fed-
eral Judiciary from Chief Justice John Roberts. The Chief Jus-
tice referenced that “inappropriate workplace conduct is not
pervasive within the Judiciary, but it also is not limited to a few
isolated instances involving law clerks” and that “misconduct,
when it does occur, is more likely to take the form of incivility
or disrespect than overt sexual harassment” and frequently
goes unreported. Although the Judiciary does have key foun-
dations in place for managing inappropriate behavior, more can
be done to encourage all employees to report misconduct to
improve the workplace environment. Chief Justice Roberts
endorsed the Working Group’s recommendations to revise the
Judiciary’s codes of conduct to define more clearly how to pro-
mote appropriate behavior, strengthen and
streamline internal procedures surrounding mis-
conduct, and expand training programs to raise
awareness of and prevent inappropriate behavior
throughout the judicial branch.
Chief Justice Roberts also recognized the
efforts of judiciary employees responding to nat-
ural disasters, including this year’s “floods in
Florida and North Carolina, Super Typhoon Yutu
in the Northern Mariana Islands, the Alaska
earthquake that damaged the Anchorage court-
house, and the new wildfires in Northern Cali-
fornia.” I serve as pro tempore Justice in the Northern Mariana
Islands (NMI), and Super Typhoon Yutu hit close to home.
Super Typhoon Yutu was the strongest storm on record to ever
hit U.S. soil and tied for the most powerful storm on earth in
2018, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Despite their own personal adversities, the
judiciary employees of the CNMI stepped up to the plate to
ensure continuity of operations. Recovery efforts are ongoing
with courts spread over various temporary locations through-
out the islands while the House of Justice (Guma’ Hustisia)
undergoes repairs. 
In closing, we all recognize that AJA is the Voice of the Judi-
ciary®, providing leadership and speaking for judges nationally
on critical issues, such as judicial independence. The rare pub-
lic rebuke of President Trump by Chief Justice Roberts when
the President criticized a judge for having improper political
motivations, and referred to him as an “Obama judge,” appro-
priately summarizes our mission. “We do not have Obama
judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,” Chief
Justice Roberts said in a statement given to the Associated
Press. “What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated
judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appear-
ing before them. That independent judiciary is something we
should all be thankful for.” I’m thankful for all of you.
Robert J. Torres, Jr.
President’s Column
Footnotes
1. Section 487.014 of the Criminal Code of Canada authorizes a
Canadian judge to issue an order requiring a person or corpora-
tion to produce a document in their possession to the police if the
judge is satisfied the document “will afford evidence respecting
the commission of [an] offence.”
The searching of media outlets by the police in Canada is,as elsewhere, a controversial topic. For instance, a recentdecision of the Supreme Court of Canada (R. v. Vice Media
Canada Inc., 2018 SCC 53), which compelled a reporter to pro-
duce material to the police concerning an alleged crime, was
described by one Canadian media outlet as a decision that will
have a “damaging effect on investigative reporting across the
country and weaken Canadian democracy” (see Global News,
https://globalnews.ca).
In this column, I intend to review the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Vice Media and recent legislation enacted
by Parliament, which now governs the authority of the police
to search media outlets for evidence. As will be seen, the con-
cern about democracy being weakened in Canada because of
the Supreme Curt’s decision is somewhat overstated. 
R. V. VICE MEDIA CANADA INC.
In Vice Media, the police applied on an ex parte basis and
obtained a production order requiring Vice Media (a large
Canadian media organization) to produce the screen captures
of messages exchanged with a source, which the police alleged
could afford evidence of terrorism offences.1
Vice Media brought an application in the Superior Court of
Ontario seeking to have the production order quashed. The
reviewing judge dismissed the application, holding that it was
open to the authorizing judge to conclude that the media’s
interest was outweighed by the public interest in obtaining
reliable evidence of very serious terrorism offences. An appeal
by Vice Media to the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed.
Vice Media appealed the Supreme Court of Canada. 
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the production
order was properly issued. The Supreme Court noted that the
“provision authorizing the type of production order issued in
this case, s. 487.014(1), grants peace officers and public officers
the ability to bring an “‘ex parte application’ for a production
order.” The Supreme Court rejected the proportion that media
outlets must be given notice of such applications (at paragraph
61), but held that this is “subject to the authorizing judge’s
overriding discretion to require notice where he or she deems
appropriate” (at paragraph 65). The Supreme Court also held
that the police must “show some evidentiary basis for why there
is ‘urgency or other circumstances,’” in order to obtain a pro-
duction order on an ex parte basis (at paragraph 69).
THE TEST FOR ISSUING
The Supreme Court held that when a judge is asked to issue
a production order in relation to the media, the authorizing
judge “should apply a four-part analysis” (at paragraph 82):
(1) Notice. First, the authorizing judge must consider
whether to exercise his or her discretion to require
notice to the media. While the statutory status quo is an
ex parte proceeding (see Criminal Code, s. 487.014(1)),
the authorizing judge has discretion to require notice
where he or she deems appropriate (see National Post, at
para. 83; CBC (ONCA), at para. 50). Proceeding ex parte
may be appropriate in “cases of urgency or other cir-
cumstances” (National Post, at para. 83). However,
where, for example, the authorizing judge considers that
he or she may not have all the information necessary to
properly engage in the analysis described below, this may
be an appropriate circumstance in which to require
notice.
(2) Statutory Preconditions. Second, all statutory
preconditions must be met (Lessard factor 1).
(3) Balancing. Third, the authorizing judge must bal-
ance the state’s interest in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of crimes and the media’s right to privacy in gather-
ing and disseminating the news (Lessard factor 3). In
performing this balancing exercise, which can be accom-
plished only if the affidavit supporting the application
contains sufficient detail (Lessard factor 4), the authoriz-
ing judge should consider all of the circumstances
(Lessard factor 2). These circumstances may include (but
are not limited to):
(a) the likelihood and extent of any potential
chilling effects;
(b) the scope of the materials sought and
whether the order sought is narrowly tailored;
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
Jounalistic Sources and the Searching
of Media Outlets in Canada
Wayne K. Gorman
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2. In R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2018 ONSC 5856 it
was noted that “[d]espite its name, the Act addresses more than
the protection of journalistic sources. It also gives a measure of
protection to the right of journalists to privacy in their gathering
or dissemination of information” (at paragraph 1). Justice Dram-
bot summarized the essence of the new legislation in the follow-
ing manner (at paragraphs 2 and 3):
The JSPA accomplishes the first of these objectives by
amending the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-5 to
protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources. It allows
journalists to refuse to disclose information or a document
that identifies or is likely to identify a journalistic source
unless the information or document cannot be obtained by
any other reasonable means and the public interest in the
administration of justice outweighs the public interest in
preserving the confidentiality of the journalistic source.
The JSPA further advances the first objective and accom-
plishes the second objective by adding restrictions to the
provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-
46 (“the Criminal Code” or “the Code”) that authorize search
warrants, orders to intercept private communications and
production orders when they relate to journalists.
3. The amendments to the Criminal Code also set out the procedure
to be followed when information is claimed to be “privileged” (see
section 488.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada). 
(c) the likely probative value of the materials;
(d) whether there are alternative sources from
which the information may reasonably be obtained
and, if so, whether the police have made all rea-
sonable efforts to obtain the information from
those sources (Lessard factor 5);
(e) the effect of prior partial publication, now
assessed on a case-by-case basis (Lessard factor 6);
and 
(f) more broadly, the vital role that the media
plays in the functioning of a democratic society
and the fact that the media will generally be an
innocent third party (Lessard factor 3).
At the end of the day, the decision as to whether to
grant the order sought is discretionary (Lessard factor 2),
and the relative importance of the various factors guiding
that discretion will vary from case to case (see New
Brunswick, at p. 478).
(4) Conditions. Fourth, if the authorizing judge
decides to exercise his or her discretion to issue the
order, he or she should consider imposing conditions on
the order to ensure that the media will not be unduly
impeded in the publishing and dissemination of the news
(Lessard factor 7). The authorizing judge may also see fit
to order that the materials be sealed for a period pending
review.
REVIEW
The Supreme Court held that when a media outlet seeks to
challenge a production order issued on an ex parte basis, the
reviewing judge may only set aside the order “if the media can
establish that — in light of the record before the authorizing
judge, as amplified on review — there was no reasonable basis
on which the authorizing judge could have granted the order.”
However, “if the media points to information not before the
authorizing judge that, in the reviewing judge’s opinion, could
reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision to
issue the order, then the media will be entitled to a de novo
review” (at paragraph 4).
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court concluded
that in this case the production
order was properly issued (at
paragraph 5):
…the state’s interest in
investigating and prosecuting
the alleged crimes outweighs
the appellants’ right to privacy
in gathering and disseminating
the news. Importantly, disclosure of the materials sought
would not reveal a confidential source; no “off the
record” or “not for attribution” communications would
be disclosed; there is no alternative source through
which the materials sought may be obtained; the source
used the media to publicize his activities with a terrorist
organization and broadcast its extremist views as a sort of
spokesperson on its behalf; and the state’s interest in
investigating and prosecuting the alleged crimes —
which include serious terrorism offences — weighs heav-
ily in the balance. Accordingly, I would dismiss the
appeal.
The Supreme Court noted that its decision did “not engage
the new Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c. 22” (at
paragraph 6). The Journalistic Sources Protection Act was
enacted on October 18, 2017.2
THE JOURNALISTIC SOURCES PROTECTION ACT
The Journalistic Sources Protection Act amended the Criminal
Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, by adding section 488.01. This
new provision allows the police to apply for a search warrant
in relation to a “journalist’s communications or an object, doc-
ument or data relating to or in the possession of a journalist”
(see section 488.01(2)). Interestingly, it requires that the appli-
cation be made to a Superior Court Judge. This is interesting
because almost all criminal cases in Canada are heard in the
Provincial Court and almost all search warrant applications
must be made to the Provincial Court Judges.3
WHO IS A JOURNALIST?
The Journalistic Sources Protection Act also amended the
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, by defining what constitutes
At the end of
the day, the
decision as to
whether to
grant the order
sought is 
discretionary.
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4. Section 552 of the Criminal Code of Canada defines what consti-
tutes a superior court judge in the various provinces.  In some
they are referred to as Supreme Court Judges.  In others, as judges
of the Queen’s Bench.  
a “journalist.” The definition now
contained in section 39.1 of the
Canada Evidence Act defines what
constitutes a journalist in very
broad terms:
Journalist means a person
whose main occupation is to
contribute directly, either reg-
ularly or occasionally, for con-
sideration, to the collection,
writing or production of 
information for dissemination by the media, or anyone
who assists such a person.
The Canada Evidence Act also defines “journalistic sources”
in broad terms:
Journalistic source means a source that confidentially
transmits information to a journalist on the journalist’s
undertaking not to divulge the identity of the source,
whose anonymity is essential to the relationship between
the journalist and the source. 
SEARCH WARRANTS-SECTION 488.01(2) OF THE 
CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA
Section 488.01(2) of the Criminal Code indicates that if the
police know that an application for a search warrant “relates to
a journalist’s communications or an object, document or data
relating to or in the possession of a journalist, they shall make
an application to a judge of a superior court of criminal juris-
diction or to a judge as defined in section 552.”4
The Criminal Code of Canada indicates (see section
488.01(3)) that a judge may only issue a search warrant that
“relates to a journalist’s communications or an object, doc-
ument or data relating to or in the possession of a journal-
ist” if:
• the information cannot otherwise be reasonably
obtained; and
• the public interest in the investigation and prosecution
of a criminal offence outweighs the journalist’s right to
privacy in gathering and disseminating information.
The new amendments also allow for the judge to whom the
search warrant application has been made to order that “a spe-
cial advocate present observations in the interests of freedom
of the press concerning the conditions set out in subsection
(3)” (see section 488.01(4)).
In addition, the new provision deals with those situations in
which the police become aware that a search has uncovered
information that “relates to a journalist’s communications or
an object, document or data relating to or in the possession of
a journalist” (see section 488.01(9)). In such cases, the police
must now “as soon as possible, make an ex parte application to
a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge
as defined in section 552 and, until the judge disposes of the
application”:
(a) refrain from examining or reproducing, in whole or
in part, any document obtained pursuant to the war-
rant, authorization or order; and
(b) place any document obtained pursuant to the war-
rant, authorization or order in a sealed packet and
keep it in a place to which the public has no access.
The judge to whom such an application is made can “con-
firm the warrant, vary the warrant...to protect the confiden-
tiality of journalistic sources and to limit the disruption of
journalistic activities”; or “revoke the warrant, authorization
or order if the judge is of the opinion that the applicant knew
or ought reasonably to have known that the application for the
warrant, authorization or order related to a journalist’s com-
munications or an object, document or data relating to or in
the possession of a journalist” (see section 488.01(9)).
What if the journalistic source search warrant is executed
and evidence is seized?
EXECUTION OF THE JOURNALISTIC SEARCH WARRANT
In such a situation the new Criminal Code provisions
requires that the information seized be “sealed by the court
that issued the warrant” (see section 488.02(1)) and that the
police refrain from examining the information unless they
have given “the journalist and relevant media outlet notice of
[their] intention to examine or reproduce the document” (see
section 488.02(2)). Upon receiving such a notice, The jour-
nalist or relevant media outlet may, within ten days of receiv-
ing the notice, “apply to a judge of the court that issued the
warrant, authorization or order to issue an order that the doc-
ument is not to be disclosed to an officer on the grounds that
the document identifies or is likely to identity a journalistic
source” (see section 488.02(3)).
If such an application is made, a judge may, pursuant to sec-
tion 488.02(5) of the Criminal Code, order that the information
seized be disclosed to the police if “satisfied” that “there is no
other way by which the information can reasonably be
obtained; and the public interest in the investigation and pros-
ecution of a criminal offence outweighs the journalist’s right to
privacy in gathering and disseminating information.” If the
judge concludes that the information should not be disclosed
to the police, the judge must order that it be returned to the
journalist or the media outlet (see section 488.02(7)).
What if the Crown seeks to introduce the information
seized at a trial? 
OBJECTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
The Journalistic Sources Protection Act amended the Canada
Evidence Act by adding section 39.1 (“Journalistic Sources”).
Section 39.1(2) of the Canada Evidence Act indicates that “a
What if the 
journalistic
source search
warrant is 
executed and
evidence is
seized?
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journalist may object to the disclosure of information or a doc-
ument before a court, person or body with the authority to
compel the disclosure of information on the grounds that the
information or document identifies or is likely to identify a
journalistic source.” In addition, judges may raise the issue “on
their own initiative” (see section 39.1(4)).
As a result of these amendments to the Canada Evidence Act,
a journalist has been given standing at a criminal trial to object
to the introduction of evidence. This is extraordinary because
Canadian criminal law does not generally allow for third-party
participation in criminal prosecutions. 
Section 39.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act indicates that
before “determining the question, the court...must give the
parties...a reasonable opportunity to present observations.”
The Canada Evidence Act does not define what the word
“observations” means. 
THE TEST
Section 39.1(7) of the Canada Evidence Act sets out a spe-
cific test to be applied in determining when such information
may be ordered to be disclosed:
The court may authorize disclosure of the information if 
• the information cannot otherwise be produced;
and
• the public interest in the administration of justice
outweighs the public interest in preserving the
confidentiality of the journalistic source.
This requires a consideration of (see section 39.1(7)):
• the importance of the information or to central
issue in the trial;
• freedom of the press, and
• the impact of disclosure on the journalistic source
and the journalist. 
APPEALS
Finally, the amendments to the Canada Evidence Act allows
for an appeal of any decision made concerning information
seized in relation to a journalist or a journalistic source (see
sections 39.1(10) and (11). 
Such an appeal must be filed within ten under days of the
decision being appealed (the normal appeal period in Canada
is thirty days). The amendments appear to allow for third-
party and interlocutory appeals and, interestingly, indicate that
such an appeal must be “heard and determined without delay
and in a summary way” (see section 39.1(12)). Canadian
appeal courts have generally discouraged interlocutory appeals
in criminal matters. It will be interesting to see what Canadian
Courts of Appeal make of this provision. 
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
The new legislation has not very received much judicial
consideration. However, there are two decisions that can be
referred to.
In Côté c. R., 2018 QCCQ 547, the accused were charged
with a number of offences involv-
ing breach of trust and fraud.
Some of the information discov-
ered during a police investigation
came into the possession of jour-
nalists. They published the infor-
mation.
The accused issued subpoenas
to a number of journalists to dis-
cover how they came into posses-
sion of the information and to support an application for a stay
of proceedings. The journalists sought to have the subpoenas
struck so as to protect their sources.
The application judge, Perreault, J.C.Q., suggested that the
Journalistic Sources Protection Act, has changed the test adopted
by the Supreme Court of Canada (the Wigmore test) for the dis-
closure of such information (see R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC
16) in the following manner (at paragraphs 189 to 193):
First, s. 39.1(9) has reversed the burden that previ-
ously fell on the journalist.
The first two elements of the Wigmore test have
been incorporated into the definition of “journalis-
tic source”.
The third element of the Wigmore test, requir-
ing that the relationship be sedulously fostered,
has been abandoned.
The fourth element of the Wigmore test has
been modified significantly. The public interest in
getting at the truth gives way to the public interest
in the administration of justice. The person seek-
ing disclosure will have to show that the public
interest in the administration of justice outweighs
the public interest in preserving the confidentiality
of the journalistic source.
Parliament has also set out a non-exhaustive list
of three factors that the court, person, or body car-
rying out this balancing exercise must consider:
• the importance of the information or document
to a central issue in the proceeding,
• freedom of the press, and
• the impact of disclosure on the journalistic
source and the journalist.
The application judge concluded that the subpoenas should
not be struck (at paragraphs 227 and 228):
In this case, the information and documents con-
cerned several aspects in addition to those of interest to
the applicants. Significant information was being pro-
vided to the public that could help them better under-
stand issues of general public interest, such as political
The journalists
sought to have
the subpoenas
struck so as to
protect their
sources.
Court Review - Volume 55 7
financing and the efforts made to stop the leaks at UPAC
concerning the versions provided during parliamentary
committees. The news was published by journalists, but
the information revealed did not identify the State
employees at the source of the leak, with the result that
this information is still not in the public domain.
The Court therefore finds that the applicants have not
discharged their burden of establishing that the public
interest in the administration of justice outweighs the
public interest in preserving the journalistic sources of
Marie-Maude Denis and Louis Lacroix.
In R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, a section 488.01
search warrant was issued allowing the police to seize from the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation a video- and audio-
recorded interview of a complainant in a sexual assault inves-
tigation. In issuing the warrant the application judge consid-
ered whether the public interest in the investigation and pros-
ecution of the criminal offence outweighed the journalist’s
right to privacy in gathering and disseminating information.
He concluded that in “light of the significant public interest in
the investigation and prosecution of sexual offences in general
and this one in particular, and the minimal interference that
the production order sought will have on journalistic privacy,
I readily conclude that the former outweighs the latter” (at
paragraph 37). 
CONCLUSION
Because of the very recent nature of the Journalistic Sources
Protection Act, it is difficult to reach any conclusions as to its
effect on the Canadian criminal justice system. Because of its
broad nature and extraordinary third-party application, its
effect may be astounding. At the very least, it sets out a process
for the difficult weighing of the search for truth versus the
importance of a free press. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
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Footnotes
1. The factual and procedural background information for this arti-
cle is taken from the California Court of Appeals’ unpublished
opinion, People v. Turner, No. H043709, 2018 WL 3751731 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
opinions/nonpub/H043709.PDF.
2. For Turner’s conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, the
statutory sentencing options were two, four, or six years in state
prison.  Turner also faced a term of three, six, or eight years in
prison for his convictions for Penetration of an Intoxicated Per-
son/Penetration of an Unconscious Person, with the potential for
the terms to run consecutively.  The district attorney recom-
mended the mid-range sentence on the first count, a four-year
sentence, to run concurrently with a six-year sentence—also in
the mid-range—for the other count. 
3. See Cal. Penal Code Section 4019(b)-(c).
4. In California, “Superior Court judges serve six-year terms and are
elected by county voters on a non-partisan ballot.  Vacancies that
occur between elections are filled through appointment by the
Governor.  An appointee serves until the next general election
when he or she must stand for election in order to retain the seat.”
See Santa Clara Superior Court, Fact Sheet—Judicial Elections
(November, 2006), available at http://www.scscourt.org/
documents/JudElections.pdf.  At the time of the Turner sentenc-
ing, Judge Persky was running unopposed and was a few days
away from reelection. 
5. In her letter to Judge Persky before the Turner sentencing, Dauber
stated that she had been “a professor at Stanford Law School for
the past 15 years,” and that she had “been deeply involved in
efforts to improve Stanford’s prevention and response to sexual
assault on campus.”  She also noted that she was the faculty co-
chair of the Board of Judicial Affairs from 2011 through 2013,
where she “helped lead a process to reform Stanford’s sexual
assault policies.”  Additionally, Dauber noted in the letter that
“[t]he victim in [the Turner] case has been a close friend of [her]
daughter since middle school,” and Dauber “kn[e]w her well.”
In March of 2016, a jury convicted Brock Allen Turner ofassault with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration of anintoxicated person, and sexual penetration of an uncon-
scious person.1 The story of Turner’s prosecution attracted
national attention even before he was sentenced. Turner, then
a 19-year-old Stanford University athlete, sexually assaulted
22-year-old Jane Doe 1 while she was unconscious behind a
dumpster near a fraternity house on campus. 
The media attention escalated to viral status when Turner
received the sentencing decision from Judge Aaron Persky,
who at the time had been a judge on the Santa Clara County
Superior Court for over a decade. The media headlines almost
wrote themselves: on the three felony counts, Turner faced up
to fourteen years in state prison; but Judge Persky rejected the
prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation of six years in prison
and instead granted Turner probation and sentenced him to a
total of six months in county jail.2 Under a California law that
allows inmates to earn one day off their sentence for each day
of good behavior,3 Mr. Turner served a total of only three
months, and was released in early September 2016. 
But Turner’s sentencing was just the beginning of the story
for Judge Persky. The Turner sentencing became the subject of
fierce public debate. A number of those who felt the sentence
was a miscarriage of justice galvanized into a movement seek-
ing to recall Judge Persky from judicial office.4 Among the lead-
ing recall proponents was Michelle Dauber, a Stanford Univer-
sity law professor who had written a letter to the judge regard-
ing Turner’s sentence.5 Dauber would eventually become the
driving force behind the campaign to recall Judge Persky.
In response, opponents of the proposed recall united in a
counter-campaign, arguing that recalling Judge Persky would
be a threat to the independence of the judiciary and would lead
to numerous negative consequences, including harsher sen-
tences, particularly for racial minorities. 
In June of 2018, the voters of Santa Clara County voted to
recall Judge Persky. This article first provides a brief factual
and procedural background of the Turner case and then sum-
marizes the positions articulated for and against the recall vote. 
OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS OF THE TURNER CASE
Shortly after midnight on January 18, 2015, two Stanford
graduate students who were biking to a fraternity house noticed
two people on the ground between a basketball court and a
wooden shed. The person on top began thrusting in a sexual
manner. One of the graduate students noticed that the person
on the bottom wasn’t moving. Both men got off their bikes and
approached the pair, calling out to ask if everything was okay.
The man who was thrusting, later identified as Turner, looked
at the approaching men, stood up, and backed away. Jane Doe
1 remained on the ground, her dress hiked up around her waist.
Turner attempted to flee, but one of the cyclists chased him
down and pinned him to the ground until police arrived.
The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Turner
with assault with intent to rape (Pen. Code § 220, subd. (a)(1);
count 1); sexual penetration of an intoxicated person (§ 289,
subd. (e); count 2); and sexual penetration of an unconscious
person (§ 289, subd. (d); count 3). Trial commenced March
14, 2016. After about six and one-half days of testimony, the
jury began deliberating. The next day, the jury returned its ver-
dict, convicting Turner of all three counts. 
Because of his conviction for assault with the intent to rape,
Turner was presumptively ineligible for probation; a down-
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6. Cal. Penal Code Section 1203.065(b).
7. See Cal. Rule of Ct. 4.413(c)(1)(A).  A copy of the Probation
Department report is available at http://documents.
latimes.com/people-v-brock-allen-turner-89/.
8. A copy of the People’s Sentencing Memorandum is available at
http://documents.latimes.com/people-v-brock-allen-turner-59/.
9. A copy of Professor Dauber’s letter to Judge Persky is available at
http://documents.latimes.com/people-v-brock-allen-turner-79/.
10. A transcript of Judge Persky’s sentencing decision is available at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/14/stanford-sex-
ual-assault-read-sentence-judge-aaron-persky.
11. See Cal. Rules of Court 4.413(c)(2)(C), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=four&linkid=
rule4_413.
12. See Cal. Rules of Court 4.414(a), (b), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=four&linkid=r
ule4_414. The 17 factors are: 
(a) Facts relating to the crime
Facts relating to the crime include:
(1)The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime as
compared to other instances of the same crime;
(2)Whether the defendant was armed with or used a weapon;
(3)The vulnerability of the victim;
(4)Whether the defendant inflicted physical or emotional
injury;
(5)The degree of monetary loss to the victim;
(6)Whether the defendant was an active or a passive participant;
(7)Whether the crime was committed because of an unusual
circumstance, such as great provocation, which is unlikely
ward departure from the statutory minimum state prison sen-
tence could only be granted if the court makes a finding that
the defendant’s case is an “unusual case where the interests of
justice would best be served” by granting probation.6 The Pro-
bation Department recommended that the court exercise its
discretion to grant this downward departure and conclude that
Turner’s crimes were “substantially less serious than the cir-
cumstances typically present in other cases involving the same
probation limitation, and the defendant has no recent record of
committing similar crimes or crimes of violence.”7
The People disagreed with the Probation Department’s rec-
ommendation. In its sentencing memorandum, the Santa Clara
District Attorney noted that the maximum prison sentence for
the convictions would be fourteen years and recommended that
the judge impose a sentence of six years. The People argued
that Turner should not receive probation because his crimes
were “more serious than other similar cases demanding a con-
siderable punishment that is commensurate to the global effects
of [his] actions.”8 The People included with their sentencing
memorandum a copy of a letter from Professor Dauber dis-
cussing the impact of Turner’s crimes on the Stanford commu-
nity. Dauber argued that Turner’s case should not be seen as less
serious than other sexual assaults.9 She also urged that proba-
tion not be granted on the basis that Turner was a “youthful”
offender, arguing that Turner was the same age as many of the
perpetrators of sexual assaults on campus. 
At the sentencing hearing, Judge Persky prefaced his
remarks about the Turner sentence with an express recognition
that the decision was a difficult one10:
And as I’m sure everyone in the court can appreciate
and as was stated several times today, it is a difficult deci-
sion. And I just want to, before I give my tentative deci-
sion, read something from [Jane Doe 1’s] statement,
which I think is appropriate — actually, two things from
her statement. She gave a very eloquent statement today
on the record, which was a briefer version of what was
submitted to the Court. Let me just say for the record
that I have reviewed everything, including the sentenc-
ing memorandum, the probation report, the attachments
to the probation report, and the respective sentencing
memoranda. And so [Jane Doe 1] wrote in her written
statement, [as read] “Ruin a life, one life, yours. You for-
got about mine. Let me
rephrase for you. ‘I want to
show people that one night of
drinking can ruin two lives’—
you and me.[’] You are the
cause; I am the effect. You have
dragged me through this hell
with you, dipped me back into
that night again and again. You
knocked down both our tow-
ers. I collapsed at the same
time you did. Your damage was
concrete: Stripped of titles,
degrees, enrollment. My damage was internal, unseen. I
carry it with me. You took away my worth, my privacy,
my energy, my time, my safety, my intimacy, my confi-
dence, my own voice, until today.” And then later on in
her written statement, she writes, [as read] “If you think
I was spared, came out unscathed, that today I ride off
into the sunset while you suffer the greatest blow, you
are mistaken. Nobody wins. We have all been devas-
tated. We have all been trying to find some meaning in
all of this suffering.” And here — I think this is relevant
to the — to the sentencing decision — she writes, [as
read] “You should have never done this to me. Secondly,
you should never have made me fight so long to tell you
you should never have done this to me. But here we are.
The damage is done. No one can undo it.
“And now we both have a choice. We can let this
destroy us. I can remain angry and hurt, and you can be
in denial. Or we can face it head on: I accept the pain;
you accept the punishment; and we move on.”
Judge Persky then announced his tentative decision was to
agree with the Probation Department’s recommendation that
Turner’s case presented unusual circumstances and to grant
probation instead of a state prison sentence. Analyzing the fac-
tors under California Rule of Court 4.413, Judge Persky con-
cluded that the presumption against probation was overcome
because Turner was “youthful” and had “no significant record
of prior criminal offenses.”11 The judge identified and dis-
cussed each of the 17 factors outlined in California Rules of
Court, rule 4.414.12
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to recur;
(8)Whether the manner in which the crime was carried out
demonstrated criminal sophistication or professionalism on
the part of the defendant; and
(9)Whether the defendant took advantage of a position of trust
or confidence to commit the crime.
(b) Facts relating to the defendant
Facts relating to the defendant include:
(1)Prior record of criminal conduct, whether as an adult or a
juvenile, including the recency and frequency of prior
crimes; and whether the prior record indicates a pattern of
regular or increasingly serious criminal conduct;
(2)Prior performance and present status on probation, manda-
tory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or
parole;
(3)Willingness to comply with the terms of probation;
(4)Ability to comply with reasonable terms of probation as indi-
cated by the defendant’s age, education, health, mental fac-
ulties, history of alcohol or other substance abuse, family
background and ties, employment and military service his-
tory, and other relevant factors;
(5)The likely effect of imprisonment on the defendant and his
or her dependents;
(6)The adverse collateral consequences on the defendant’s life
resulting from the felony conviction;
(7)Whether the defendant is remorseful; and
(8)The likelihood that if not imprisoned the defendant will be a
danger to others.
13. See Probation Department Report, available at
http://documents.latimes.com/people-v-brock-allen-turner-89/.
14. See id. 
15. Turner appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeals,
which affirmed on August 8, 2018. People v. Turner, No. H043709,
2018 WL 3751731 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/H043709.PDF.
16. The Turner sentence was met with a fairly rapid legislative
response.  Approximately five months after Judge Persky handed
down the Turner sentence, California governor Jerry Brown signed
a bill that toughens penalties for attacks on unconscious victims.
In particular, Assembly Bill 2888 (2016) removes a judge’s discre-
tion to grant probation in cases where the victim of a sexual assault
is unconscious.  See Sarah Larimer, In the Aftermath of Brock Turner
Case, California’s Governor Signs Sex Crime Bill,
WASH. POST (Sep. 30, 2016), available at https://www.washingto-
npost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/30/in-aftermath-of-
brock-turner-case-californias-governor-signs-sex-crime-
bill/?noredirect=on&utm_term =.f728a5799003.
17. The Recall Aaron Persky website is no longer available, but
archived versions can be accessed at https://web.archive.org/
web/20180101224233/http://recallaaronpersky.com/.
18. Judge Persky’s Other Cases, available at https://web.archive.org/
web/20180119094645/http://www.recallaaronpersky.com:80/judge
_persky_s_other_cases. The recall proponents referred to the cases
of Ikaika Gunderson, Keenan Smith, Robert Chain, and the “De
Anza Gang Rape” case. According to the recall proponents, these
cases presided over by Judge Persky show that he “has a long-
standing pattern of bias in favor of privileged defendants.”
The judge found the following
crime-related criteria to be rele-
vant to his decision:
• the nature, seriousness, and cir-
cumstances of the crime as com-
pared to other instances of the
same crime
• the vulnerability of the victim
• whether the defendant inflicted physical or emotional injury
• whether the defendant was an active participant in the crime
• whether the defendant demonstrated criminal sophistication.
The judge found the following defendant-related criteria to
be relevant to his decision:
• the defendant’s prior criminal record
• the defendant’s willingness and ability to comply with the
terms of probation
• the likely effect of imprisonment on the defendant
• the adverse collateral consequences on the defendant from
the felony conviction
• whether the defendant is remorseful
• whether or not the defendant was likely be a danger to others
The Probation Department’s report contained two assess-
ment tools that had been used to analyze Turner’s dangerous-
ness. Turner had received a score of 3 on the Static-99R, which
is an actuarial measure of sexual offense recidivism. This had
the effect of placing him in the “Low-Moderate range of risk
relative to other adult male sex offenders.”13 Turner was also
assessed under the Corrections Assessment Intervention Sys-
tem (CAIS), “a standardized, validated assessment and case
management system developed by the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency [which] assesses a defendant’s crim-
inogenic needs and risk to re-offend.”14 Based on the CAIS
assessment, Turner would benefit from family therapy, would
need to learn new coping skills, and would need to be treated
for drug and alcohol abuse. 
After announcing his tentative ruling, the judge heard from
the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the Probation Depart-
ment. In the end, Judge Persky granted probation and sen-
tenced Turner to six months in the county jail. The judge did
require Turner to register as a sex offender for life and that
Turner submit to random drug and alcohol testing.15
RESPONSE TO THE TURNER SENTENCING
While the Turner case had already made national news even
before Turner was convicted, the Turner sentence galvanized
pubic attention. Outcry over the perceived leniency of the sen-
tence swept the nation.16
Professor Dauber, who as noted above had submitted a letter
to Judge Persky strenuously urging that Turner not be granted
probation, led the charge of what would become a campaign to
recall Judge Persky from the bench: the “Recall Aaron Persky”
campaign.17 Proponents of the recall argued that Judge Persky’s
sentencing of Turner demonstrated that he was biased and unfit
to sit on the bench. They argued that Judge Persky “appeared to
favor athletes and other relatively privileged individuals
accused of sex crimes or violence against women.”18 Recall pro-
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19. Judge Persky himself also brought a lawsuit challenging the recall
election in court. See Persky v. Bushey, 21 Cal. App. 5th 810, 815,
230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 658, 661 (Ct. App. 2018), review denied (May 1,
2018).  Persky argued that the recall election was procedurally
defective in a number of respects.  See id. The recall proponents,
including Dauber, intervened as real parties in interest and
defended the procedural propriety of the recall election.  The
court ultimately ruled against Persky and allowed the recall elec-
tion to proceed, and the California Court of Appeals affirmed.  See
id. Dauber also sought and was awarded attorney’s fees in con-
nection with the lawsuit, under a California statute that provides
that a prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees from an oppo-
nent when seeking to enforce “an important right affecting the
public interest.”  Elena Kadvany, Persky Ordered to Pay Recall
Campaign Attorney’s Fees, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2018),
available at: https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2018/10/
25/persky-ordered-to-pay-recall-campaign-attorneys-fees. 
20. The Voices Against Recall website has since been taken 
down, but archived versions can be accessed at
https://web.archive.org/web/20180423164925/http:/www.voices
againstrecall.org/ 
21. Santa Clara County Bar Association, SCCBA Statement on Judicial
Independence, SCCBA (June 14, 2016), available at:
https://sccba.site-ym.com/blogpost/1133925/249782/SCCBA-
Statement-on-Judicial-Independence.
22. Law Professors’ Statement for Independence of the Judiciary and
Against the Recall of Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron
Persky, available at https://www.mercurynews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/90-law-professors-statement-for-the-
independence-of-the-judiciary-and-against-the-petition-for-
recall-of-santa-clara-superior-court-judge-aaron-persky-1-
docx.pdf. The law professors stated that “[t]he mechanism of
recall was designed for and must be limited to cases where judges
are corrupt or incompetent or exhibit bias that leads to systematic
injustice in their courtrooms. None of these criteria applies to
Judge Persky.”
23. County of Santa Clara, Office of the District Attorney, DA Makes
Statement on Brock Turner Sentencing (June 6, 2016), available at
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/newsroom/newsreleases/Pages/NR
A2016/DA-on-Turner-Sentence.aspx (“While I strongly disagree
with the sentence that Judge Persky issued in the Brock Turner
case I do not believe he should be removed from his judgeship. I
am so pleased that the victim’s powerful and true statements about
the devastation of campus sexual assault are being heard across
our nation. She has given voice to thousands of sexual assault sur-
vivors.”).
24. State of California, Commission on Judicial Performance, Home
(last updated November 28, 2018), available at: https://cjp.ca.gov/:
The commission’s authority is limited to investigating alle-
gations of judicial misconduct and, if warranted, imposing
discipline. Judicial misconduct usually involves conduct in
conflict with the standards set forth in the Code of Judicial
Ethics. The commission cannot change a decision made by
any judicial officer; this is a function of the state’s appellate
courts. After investigation, and in some cases a public hear-
ing, the commission may impose sanctions ranging from
confidential discipline to removal from office.
ponents did not argue that Judge Persky had violated the law or
committed any legal error in the sentencing. 
The following “Mission Statement” summarizes the posi-
tion of the recall proponents:
We are outraged at Judge Persky’s actions, and we
don’t just want talk, we want to take him out of office.
That is why the Committee to Recall Judge Persky is the
only effort in existence that has put together a compre-
hensive plan and team that can actually take Persky out
of office, so that he can no longer shield sex offenders
from justice.
Additionally, the Recall Aaron Persky website listed the fol-
lowing under a heading titled, “Why the recall?” 
Aaron Persky gave too lenient a sentence to Brock
Turner, a former Stanford Swimmer convicted of sexual
assault. Turner was only sentenced to six months for his
heinous crime, and Persky cited the impact prison would
have on Turner’s life in his decision. Persky is unfit to sit on
the bench, and as long as he is a judge, predators in Santa
Clara County will know they have an ally on the bench.
In response, numerous groups came out publicly against
the recall.19 In particular, one group, called Voices Against
Recall, was led by LaDoris Cordell, a former superior court
judge in Santa Clara county.20 According to the Voices Against
Recall, other opponents of the recall included the Santa Clara
County Bar Association21; a
group of more than 90 law pro-
fessors in California22; district
attorneys in Santa Clara County,
including Jeffrey Rosen, whose
office prosecuted Turner23; the
Santa Clara Public Defender; sev-
eral retired federal district court
judges and California Supreme
Court justices; and over 200 cur-
rent and retired California Supe-
rior Court judges. The Voices
Against Recall group argued that recalling a judge should be a
monumental, and rare, occurrence. The opponents of the
recall emphasized the value of an independent judiciary, argu-
ing that a judge who must first assess the political popularity
of a decision before rendering it, out of concern for job secu-
rity, is not fulfilling the proper function of the judiciary. Recall
opponents also asserted that the true burden of the recall of
Judge Persky would be felt by criminal defendants, particu-
larly those of racial minorities, with judges imposing harsher
sentences on defendants out of concern for the political pop-
ularity of the decision.
Opponents of the recall also pointed out that the California
Commission on Judicial Performance, an “independent state
agency responsible for investigating complaints of judicial mis-
conduct,”24 released its findings in December 2016 that after
thoroughly evaluating the charges against Judge Persky for
judicial misconduct, the CJP concluded that there had been no
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25. Commission on Judicial Performance Closes Investigation of Judge
Aaron Persky, available at https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/
sites/40/2016/08/Persky_Explanatory_Statement_12-19-16.pdf.
The Commission on Judicial Performance explained its conclu-
sion as follows: 
First, the [Turner] sentence was within the parameters
set by law and was therefore within the judge’s discretion.
Second, the judge performed a multi-factor balancing
assessment prescribed by law that took into account both
the victim and the defendant. Third, the judge’s sentence
was consistent with the recommendation in the probation
report, the purpose of which is to fairly and completely eval-
uate various factors and provide the judge with a recom-
mended sentence. Fourth, comparison to other cases han-
dled by Judge Persky that were publicly identified does not
support a finding of bias.
26. Response to the Commission on Judicial Performance, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20180101080614/http://www.recallaa
ronpersky.com:80/response_to_the_commission_on_judicial_per
formance; see also Elena Kadvany, Analysis of Judge Persky’s “Pat-
tern” Cases, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Last updated May 15, 2018),
available at: https://paloaltoonline.com/news/2018/05/11/analysis-
of-judge-perskys-pattern-cases.
27. Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters, Official Final Results (last
updated July 9, 2018), available at http://results.enr.clarity
elections.com/CA/Santa_Clara/75369/Web02.203317/#/c/C_2.
misconduct.25 Proponents of the recall, however, challenged
the Commission’s conclusion in a written “Response to the
Commission on Judicial Performance” that criticized the accu-
racy of the Commission’s report.26
In the end, the voters of Santa Clara County voted to recall
Judge Persky in June of 2018, with approximately 60% voting
yes and 40% voting no.27
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AJA offers this timely, engaging and convenient resource at no cost to judges who
want to apply this state of the art learning to make our communities safer.
Visit http://education.amjudges.org to learn more.
EFFECTIVE ADJUDICATION OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES
aja journey to cuba
february 17-22, 2020
(with optional extension to February 24)
The AJA invites you and your guest(s) to join our private delegation for an eye-
opening journey at this most pivotal time in U.S.-Cuba relations. Our specially 
designed program will explore Cuba’s rich and varied cultural heritage. We 
will go beyond tourist corridors by engaging with local scholars, attorneys, 
musicians and artists who will oer in-depth commentary on the Cuban legal 
system, art, history, architecture, and religion.
We have teamed with Cuba Cultural Travel to create this extraordinary trip. 
Our private journeys (space is limited) include the following: 
• Thought-provoking lectures by renowned scholars and legal experts 
• Private performances and reception by prominent dance companies 
and musicians
• Exploration of the fascinating neighborhoods of Havana in the company 
of an architect and historian
To request a brochure and registration information, please email Shelley 
Rockwell at srockwell@ncsc.org.
CUSTOM DESIGNED PROGRAM INCLUDES
• Itinerary design and coordination
• Compliance with US Treasury Department
• 5 Star Hotel Melia Cohiba
Extension includes Hotel Melia San Carlos Cienfuegos
• All ground transportation
• Full time private tour escort
• Daily breakfast in Cuba
• Airport transfer to/from Havana airport
• Meals as listed in itinerary (including tips)
• Entrance fees to museums etc.
• Bottled water on bus and in room
• Gratuities for restaurants, porters
• Cuban Tourist Card/Visa
EXCLUDES
• Airfare to/from Cuba
• Airline baggage fees
• Gratuities for guide and driver
• Individualized hotel expenses (mini bar, room service, laundry fees, etc)
• Trip cancellation insurance
standard program
February 17-22, 2020
Double Occupancy (per person):  $3,375
Single Occupancy: $3,710
extended program
February 17-24, 2020
Double Occupancy (per person):  $4,575
Single Occupancy: $5,110
Organized by:
What message do voters send by removing a judgefrom office based on disagreement with a lawfuljudicial decision? That question is at the heart of
this issue of the American Judges Association’s Court Review,
which focuses on the issue in light of the 2018 recall of Cali-
fornia Judge Aaron Persky based on public outrage at the law-
ful, but extremely lenient, sentence he gave to a Stanford Uni-
versity student-athlete in a highly publicized sexual assault
case. The message to other judges: Impose harsher sentences?
Or perhaps a more specific message: Take sexual assault cases
seriously? Viewed broadly, is this an example of the voters
demanding accountability in sentencing, or of voters sending a
more insidious message—Rule in a way that is not in step with
the prevailing public opinion and risk your position as a judge?
Despite the valid concerns caused by the Stanford case, it is
this latter message that, in my view, presents the greatest threat
to judicial independence. 
In 2010, those who opposed same-sex marriage in Iowa sent
precisely this dangerous message. An aptly named TV ad,
“Send Them a Message,” urged Iowa voters to “vote NO” on
the retention of three respected Iowa Supreme Court justices,
characterizing them as “activist judges” who “ignor[e] the will
of voters,” “legislat[e] from the bench,” and “usurp the will of
voters.”1 The ad was part of a larger, politically motivated cam-
paign to oust the three justices who were on the ballot for
merit retention. To be clear, the outrage was not based on the
justices’ ethics, professionalism, jurisprudence, or judicial
integrity. Rather, the effort to remove these justices focused on
one particular, unanimous decision striking down, as uncon-
stitutional, Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage. The message: Do
not ignore the will of the voters.
But this message is the antithesis of the role of the judiciary
in our democracy. Judges should decide cases based on the
facts and the law, not the will of the voters. Our branch is not
intended to be political. Our judges are expected to be fair and
impartial—not swayed by popular opinion, or pressures from
special interests or the other two branches of government. Per-
haps Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it best: “The Founders
realized that there has to be someplace where being right is
more important than being popular or powerful, and where
fairness trumps strength. And in our country that place is sup-
posed to be the courtroom.”2
Yet, in 2012, inspired by the success of that 2010 campaign
in Iowa, special interest groups3 targeted my colleagues, Jus-
tices Peggy Quince and R. Fred Lewis, and me when we were
on Florida’s ballot for merit retention in 2012. As I have
detailed in several articles,4 our opponents used some of the
same political messages employed in Iowa—especially that
catch-all, ill-defined term: “activist judges.” They used selected
opinions from our Court that, although jurisprudentially
sound, could be reduced to potentially controversial sound
bites. Their true goal: oust us to give the governor his chance
to select three new justices who presumably would be more in
line with his judicial philosophy.5 The attacks required my col-
leagues and me to travel the state to speak to Florida voters
and editorial boards, attempting to explain that the campaign
against us was not based on our integrity, professionalism, or
competence.
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The Threat to a Fair and Impartial State-Court Judiciary
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So, how do we strike the appropriate balance between judi-
cial accountability and maintaining a fair and impartial judi-
ciary? This article attempts to answer that question by explain-
ing why state courts are more vulnerable to attack than federal
courts, defining proper characteristics for voters to consider in
reviewing judges on the ballot for election or merit retention,
and suggesting ways to ensure that judges and justices are less
vulnerable to be removed or influenced by vocal public opin-
ions or by special interests. Recent history has shown that,
despite the good intentions of adopting a less political method
of appointing and retaining judges and justices through a merit-
based system, more needs to be done to further insulate state
court judges from improper removal, or even influence, based
on disagreement with specific judicial decisions. 
WHY STATE COURTS ARE MORE VULNERABLE TO
ATTACK THAN FEDERAL
Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges per-
form a function fundamentally different from that of the peo-
ple’s elected representatives in the other two branches of gov-
ernment.6 Legislative and executive officials are expected to
consider public opinion, special interests who lobby, their
political party agendas, or even their own personal opinions
about issues.  But judges are expected to act to protect the
rights guaranteed in the Constitution and to enforce the rule of
law so that all who come before court are treated equally and
without “fear or favor.” Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
have warned of the corrosive effect of treating judges like
politicians. For example, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it:
“[N]othing less than democracy itself is at stake if partisan
groups are allowed to throw . . . justices off [their states’]
high court[s].”7 The reason for the threat is clear: even if ulti-
mately unsuccessful, attacks against the judiciary present the
real danger that the judge will fear removal if the public dis-
agrees with a decision.8
To guard against this threat, our Founders provided the fun-
damental tenet in our Constitution that federal judges be
appointed to “lifetime tenure with removal only for high
crimes and misdemeanors.”9 This system effectively prevents
the specter of removal for issuing an unpopular opinion with
which the public, politicians, or special interests disagree.10
The federal system of lifetime appointment also creates a clear
distinction between the judiciary and the other two political
branches of government. 
For example, although U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl
Warren was under attack for the
Court’s then-unpopular 1954
unanimous opinion in Brown v.
Board of Education,11 which he
authored, he was not in danger of
removal. Despite billboards in the
South that read “Impeach Earl
Warren,”12 which appeared imme-
diately after the Court issued its
decision in Brown, Chief Justice
Warren’s judicial position was
never in jeopardy. Because of the
constitutional protection designed
wisely by our Founders, the public’s disagreement with the
opinion could never constitute grounds to remove Chief Justice
Warren or any other member of that Court. This enabled the
Justices to decide the case based on the Constitution, not based
on which side enjoyed greater public support.  
Of course, even the federal model of lifetime appointment
does not immunize federal judges from personal attacks.
Throughout history, but intensifying more recently, various
groups, such as the media, lobbyists, and politicians—includ-
ing, even at times, the President of the United States—have
attacked federal judges for decisions with which they disagree
and, on occasion, have specifically attacked not just the deci-
sion but the decision maker. As the President of the American
Bar Association (ABA) recently explained:
Disagreeing with a court’s decision is everyone’s right,
but when government officials question a court’s
motives, mock its legitimacy or threaten retaliation due
to an unfavorable ruling, they intend to erode the court’s
standing and hinder the courts from performing their
constitutional duties.13
After U.S. President Donald Trump referred to a federal
judge as “an Obama Judge,” criticizing an adverse ruling and
the judge himself, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Roberts publicly “defended the independence and integrity of
the federal judiciary,” stating:
We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush
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(Spring 2015).
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47 TULSA L. REV. 141, 154 (2011). Other common criticism of
merit selection includes “that it puts elites in control of selecting
judges,” and “nominating commissions operate in secret with no
public accountability.” Reddick & Kourlis, supra note 15, at 8.
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28. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 55 (explaining why public
accountability, at some level, is important).
judges or Clinton judges[.] . . .
What we have is an extraordinary
group of dedicated judges doing
their level best to do equal right
to those appearing before them.
That independent judiciary is
something we should all be
thankful for.14
Unlike the federal system, virtu-
ally all state judiciaries—whether
selected by contested elections, gubernatorial appointment,
legislative selection, or commission-based gubernatorial
appointment—do not enjoy the protections enshrined in our
federal constitution.15 Instead, jurisdictions across the country
use various processes because the method of judicial selection,
as well as terms of service, are controlled by each state’s own
constitution.16 Sometimes, different jurisdictions within the
same state even use different processes.17
Many states adopted merit-based systems for judicial selec-
tion and retention in an effort to insulate state-court judges as
much as possible from the politics seen in elections in the
other two branches.18 Under the merit-based system, judges
are appointed by the state’s governor after review by a com-
mission based on their qualifications, which “typically
include a candidate’s legal ability, integrity and impartiality,
professionalism and temperament, and any other necessary
skills for the level or jurisdiction of the court to which the
candidate is applying.”19 Then, periodically throughout their
term depending on the state’s constitution, the judge appears
on the ballot.20 Voters vote yes or no as to whether the judge
should retain his or her seat and “does not face a chal-
lenger.”21
Unfortunately, history has shown that even merit-based sys-
tems are not immune from attack. Since 2010, special interest
groups have increasingly interfered in retention elections, a
topic on which voters are often under-educated,22 by mischar-
acterizing judges and their decisions. “[S]pecial interest groups
seek to remove good judges whose only offense is having ruled
according to the law, rather than the special interest groups’
agenda.”23 In fact, the most recent report from the Brennan
Center for Justice explains that merit-based systems have
become more political in recent years, to the point that any
intended decrease in political influence by adopting the merit-
based system may be lost.24 Some argue that merit-based sys-
tems are more political than elections.25 Even more concerning,
some of these efforts by special interest groups to oust well-
qualified jurists, as in Iowa, have been successful.
Some, myself included, attribute the rise of these politically
motivated attacks against the judiciary on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s January 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.26 As Wallace Jefferson, former Chief Justice of
the Texas Supreme Court, and I explained in 2015, Citizens
United and other decisions “led to unrestricted spending from
outside groups” on elections in all three branches of govern-
ment.27
Accountability for the conduct of judges, like all public offi-
cials, is, of course, critical to a well-functioning democracy.
However, a threat arises when the “accountability” is based on
one-sided attacks or mere disagreement with an isolated deci-
sion.28 And, “accountability” in the form of voters at the ballot
box choosing to remove the judge poses a great danger to judi-
cial independence. Ironically, Professor Margaret Lemos, pro-
fessor and Senior Associate Dean for Faculty and Research at
Duke Law, explains that, at least in the abstract, the public
actually disfavors politicization of the courts:
Studies of state court systems . . . suggest that the
more political the judicial-selection system, the lower
the public’s sense of the legitimacy of the courts. Public
confidence in the courts tends to be lower in states with
partisan judicial elections than in other kinds of selec-
tion systems. When the public hears about judges
accepting campaign contributions or being subjected to
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35. For example, as the recent impeachment of four West Virginia
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judges are accountable to the public in their positions as govern-
mental actors. West Virginia House Votes to Impeach Four West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court Justices; Senate Schedules Trial, BRENNAN CTR.
JUST.: FAIR CTS. E-LERT (Aug. 24, 2018). Yet, some have posited
that the alleged improper use of funds was a smokescreen for a
political agenda by the other branches. See Meagan Flynn, West
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Crisis. Stay Tuned., WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2018),
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36. See generally, e.g., Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of
Florida, Fla. Supreme Ct., http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/
decisions/ethics/canon7.shtml (last updated June 18, 2015); Code
of Judicial Conduct, N.J. Courts (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/rules/cjc.pdf; Oregon Code
of Judicial Conduct, Or. Cts. (2013), https://www.courts.
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or using attack ads, public support for and confidence in
the courts diminishes.29
While principled criticism of judicial decisions is part of a
functioning democracy, the threat of removal is antithetical to
the Framers’ core principle of an independent and non-politi-
cal judicial branch of government.30 Jurists should not perceive
a potential threat to their position if they rule in a way that is
unpopular, or out of step with public opinion, special interests,
or the other political branches. 
Ultimately, the question is whether there is ever an appro-
priate reason for voters to remove a judge because of disagree-
ment with a judicial decision. My response is a resounding
“no.” Removal on these grounds presents the real risk of mak-
ing judges accountable to the voters, those in power, and those
whose interests are threatened by judicial decisions. Such
“accountability” undermines judicial legitimacy, threatens
judicial independence, and upends the essential role of the
judiciary—to protect each person’s (whether individual or cor-
porate) constitutional rights, which may, at times, prove
counter to the majority view, special interests, or the other two
branches of government. 
So, what are the proper considerations to ensure a balance
between accountability and judicial independence? The next sec-
tion explains these five proper considerations for evaluating
judges or judicial candidates: (1) integrity, (2) professional com-
petence, (3)judicial temperament, (4)experience, and (5)service.
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY: PROPER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Despite the attention of several prestigious groups of
lawyers—including the American
Bar Association (ABA),31 the Amer-
ican Judicature Society,32 and the
American College of Trial
Lawyers33—the threat of improper
influence on our state judiciary
remains a serious problem that
threatens the essence of a fair and
impartial judiciary.34 Because
attacks against the judiciary con-
tinue, it is important to determine
the proper factors that should be considered in electing, retain-
ing, or even impeaching or recalling judges—whether by vot-
ers, the executive, or the legislature. Strong arguments sup-
porting judicial accountability exist, especially when the
breaches arise from actual judicial misconduct.35
But judicial accountability should not come at the expense
of judicial independence or fairness. In fact, there are already
several forms of accountability in place that appropriately
strike this balance. First, there is an important check on judi-
cial behavior in that all judges are required to follow their
state’s Code of Judicial Conduct.36 With respect to misconduct,
that accountability is properly monitored by strong judicial
qualifications commissions. 
Accountability also derives from the basic requirement that
trial judges adhere to precedent and follow the rules of evi-
dence, and their decisions are subject to review by a higher
court. As the Supreme Court of Washington has explained:
Judicial independence does not equate to unbridled
discretion to bully and threaten, to disregard the require-
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ments of the law, or to ignore the
constitutional rights of defen-
dants. . . . Judicial independence
requires a judge to commit to
following the constitution, the
statutes, common law principles,
and precedent without intrusion
from or intruding upon other
branches of government. It does
not refer to independence from
judicial disciplinary bodies (or
from higher courts). Decision making is constrained by
the evidence, by appropriate procedural rules, records and
legal principles.37
In an attempt to advance the goal of a fair and impartial
judiciary, the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ)
launched its Informed Voters Project (IVP), “a non-partisan
voter education initiative developed to increase public aware-
ness about the judicial system, to inform voters that politics
and special interest attacks have no place in the courts, and to
give voters the tools they need to ensure judges are appointed
and elected on the basis of their character and ability.”38 IVP
offers the following five factors as proper considerations in
evaluating judicial candidates for selection and retention—(1)
integrity, (2) professional competence, (3) judicial tempera-
ment, (4) experience, and (5) service—which frame the dis-
cussion below.39 Similarly, former U.S. Supreme Court’s Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan,
sets forth the following “values desired in individual judges”:
fairness and impartiality, competence, judicial philosophy, pro-
ductivity and efficiency, clarity, demeanor and temperament,
community, and separation of politics from adjudication.40
1. INTEGRITY
First, IVP explains that judges should be of the highest
integrity: “[a] judge should be honest, impartial, and commit-
ted to the rule of law.”41 Likewise, Canon 1 of the ABA’s Model
Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges “shall uphold and
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary.”42 Given that each state’s code of judicial conduct
and the federal and state constitutions are the lynchpins to
judicial service,43 violating these obligations would properly
subject a judge or justice to consequence, including removal.44
As the Brennan Center explains, “A judge’s job is to apply
the law fairly and to protect our rights, even when doing so is
unpopular or angers the wealthy and powerful.”45 Therefore,
as discussed above, “the reality of competing in costly, highly
politicized elections is at odds with this role.”46 Justice Gins-
burg, joined by Justice Breyer, addressed this in 2015 in her
concurring in part opinion in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar:
“Favoritism,” i.e., partiality, if inevitable in the polit-
ical arena, is disqualifying in the judiciary’s domain. . . .
Unlike politicians, judges are not “expected to be respon-
sive to [the] concerns” of constituents. McCutcheon [v.
Fed. Election Comm’n,] 134 S. Ct. [1434,] 1441 [(2014)]
(plurality opinion). Instead, “it is the business of judges
to be indifferent to popularity.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 401, n. 29, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).47
Of course, situations in which a judge should be removed
may not be so clear cut. As others have recognized, these
“characteristics . . . are . . . difficult to measure.”48 What if a
judge’s decisions reflect impermissible bias based on race, eth-
nicity, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of bias?49
What if a judge uses a racial slur while performing his or her
official duties, or in public? For example, in 2018, Florida trial
judge was under review for “using the word ‘moolie’ to
describe a black defendant . . . while speaking with the
defendant’s lawyer in chambers about scheduling.”50 After
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attempting to justify the use of this word,51 “Millan agreed to
undergo racial sensitivity training,” but Florida’s Judicial Qual-
ifications Committee (JQC) recommended that Millan be sus-
pended from the bench for thirty days without pay, fined
$5,000, and subject to a public reprimand.52 The Florida JQC
wrote: “The use of racially derogatory and demeaning language
to describe litigants, criminal defendants or members of the
public, even behind closed doors or during off-the-record con-
versations, erodes public confidence in a fair and impartial
judiciary.”53 After the Supreme Court of Florida unanimously
rejected the JQC’s proposed sanctions and sent the case back
for a full hearing, Millan resigned from the bench.54
In a similar vein, Florida trial judge Mark Hulsey III was
charged by the Florida JQC for making racist and sexist com-
ments in court and “misus[ing] his judicial assistant and staff
attorneys.”55 “[F]acing potential impeachment by the Florida
Legislature and” discipline by the JQC, Hulsey resigned.56 As
the cases of Millan and Hulsey show, the proper response to
improper judicial actions by overt acts of bias does not seem to
be removal by the voters but, rather, a more vigorous use of the
JQC or appropriate disciplinary body. The message this time:
Explicit prejudice will not be tolerated in the courts.
2. PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
Second, as to “professional competence,” IVP explains that
“[a] judge should have a keen intellect, extensive legal knowl-
edge and strong writing skills.”57 Professional competence
matters in both judicial selection—for determining whether a
candidate is qualified for the role based on the state’s specific
qualifications—and judicial retention. Fortunately, judicial
competence has rarely been challenged in judicial retention
elections. 
3. JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
Third, as to “judicial temperament,” IVP explains that “[a]
judge must be neutral, decisive, respectful and composed.”58
Similarly, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan explains that
judges must be “patient and even-keeled” as well as “collegial
and humble,” meanwhile “command[ing] respect from the
community and from those who enter the courthouse,” which
the judge should “work to make . . . a comfortable place.”59
Canon 2 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vides: “A judge shall perform the
duties of judicial office impar-
tially, competently, and dili-
gently.”60
An example of accountability
on this front comes from Ari-
zona, where voters in 2014,
recalled a judge for the first time
since 1978.61 Judge Benjamin
Norris of Maricopa County
Superior Court was presiding
over a custody case when the fol-
lowing ensued:
The mother’s attorney was trying to convince Norris
that the father should not have unlimited access to his
two daughters, but Norris had quashed the subpoena of
the Child Protective Services caseworkers who were sup-
posed to testify.
Then, when the mother’s attorney asked if Norris had
watched a video of an earlier hearing in which a judge
had imposed a protective order against the father, Norris
flew into a rage.
“I work 12-hour days,” he said. “And if you start mak-
ing me watch two hours of video for every hour hearing,
I don’t have 36 hours in a day.”
“Why are you yelling at me?” the lawyer asked.
“Because I’m upset by this.”62
The hearing continued. “Nothing was accomplished.”63
Norris’s “lack of civility,” which other judges had also noticed,
“resulted in a bad review of his performance as a judge” by the
Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review.64 In
response to the Commission’s review, the Maricopa County
electorate rejected Norris’s retention,65 sending this message:
Judges will be required to maintain a certain level of civility and
patience in performing their judicial duties. “[M]any in the legal
community” considered Norris’s loss “a validation for the judi-
cial-retention ballot.”66
In contrast to the message voters send when they merely
disagree with a judicial decision, the message sent to Judge
Norris was properly based on his actions in performing his role
51. Perez, supra note 50.
52. Id.; accord eds., Racial Bias in the Courtroom Undercuts Justice,
MIAMI HERALD (July 15, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/
opinion/editorials/article214917125.html.
53. Perez, supra note 50.
54. Order, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No.17-570, No. SC18-775
(Fla. June 8, 2018); Ovalle, supra note 50.
55. Larry Hannan, Jacksonville Judge Accused of Racist and Sexist Com-
ments Resigns, Jacksonville.com (Jan. 23, 2017).
56. Id.
57. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39; see In re Barnes, 510 N.E.2d 392,
398 (Ct. App. Ohio 1986); Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note
15.
58. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
59. O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, supra note 40, at 3.
60. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 42.
61. Michael Kiefer, Merit Proponents: Voting Out Judge Out Shoes Sys-
tem Works, AZCentral (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/arizona/politics/2014/11/07/merit-proponents-voting-
judge-shows-system-works/18654583/.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. After conducting surveys, asking for self-evaluations, and
holding interviews with judges, “the commissioners tallied up the
data as to Norris’ qualifications to remain on the bench” and
“rated him at the bottom.” Id. The commission voted 23-3 that
Judge Norris “did not meet adequate standards.” Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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67. Another example of a judge’s proper removal for improper conduct
that affected the judge’s official role was seen recently with the sus-
pension of Michigan County Judge Theresa Brennan. See Oralan-
dar Brand-Williams, State Panel: Stop Paying Livingston County
Judge Brennan, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.detroit-
news.com/story/news/2019/01/16/state-panel-stop-paying-liv-
ingston-county-judge-brennan/2593509002/.
68. Marc Freeman, High Court Removes Palm Beach County Judge Over
Campaign Misconduct, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL (July 2, 2018),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-pn-judge-
santino-supreme-court-ruling-20180702-story.html.
69. Id.
70. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 16-534 RE: Dana Marie Santino,
43 FLA. L. WEEKLY S477, 2018 WL 5095128, *10 (Fla. Oct. 19, 2018).
71. “Experience” is defined as the “[a]ctive participation in events or
activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill.” Expe-
rience, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=experience
(last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
72. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
73. O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, supra note 40, at 2.
74. “Service” is defined as “[e]mployment in duties or work for
another, as for a government.” service, Am. Heritage Dictionary
Eng. Language, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=service (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
75. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
76. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 42.
77. See, e.g., Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Justice,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/lifestyle/1996/11/26/injustice-claims-a-tennessee-
judge/f0a28c33-fcb1-4c1b-9471-2d5704d56a88/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.fca53f190689 (explaining the removal of Justice
Penny White in Tennessee in 1996); Georgiana Vines, Where Are
They Now: Election Loss Led to Success in Academia for Former TN
Justice Penny White, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Sep. 6, 2014),
http://archive.knoxnews.com/entertainment/life/where-are-they-
now-election-loss-led-to-success-in-academia-for-former-tn-jus-
tice-penny-white-ep-596-354313321.html (same).
78. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1529;
see A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/
04/us/politics/04judges.html.
79. See Bannon, supra note 24, at 10; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); 
as a judge.67 Judges acting in the
manner that Judge Norris acted
threatens judicial legitimacy;
whereas, the exact opposite is true of
removing judges based on their rea-
soned decisions.
Judicial temperament may also be
compromised when judges are forced
to participate in contested elections.
Just this year, the Florida Supreme
Court removed a state trial judge for
2016 campaign violations.68 While
running against criminal defense
attorney Gregg Lerman, Dana Marie Santino’s campaign cre-
ated “a Facebook page that blasted opponent Lerman’s defense
of ‘Palm Beach County’s worst criminals’ and listed a few of his
higher-profile cases. The page showed a photo of Lerman sur-
rounded by the words ‘child pornography,’ ‘murder,’ ‘rape’ and
more, in boldface and all capital letters.”69 In its opinion
removing Santino from the bench, the Florida Supreme Court
wrote that “Santino’s conduct does not evidence a present fit-
ness to hold judicial office.”70 Again, the message seems proper
and reflects the principles espoused in nationwide judicial
codes of conduct: Judges will be required to maintain a certain
level of character and dignity in all actions.
4. EXPERIENCE
Fourth, as to “experience,”71 IVP explains that “[a] judge
should have a strong record of professional excellence in the
law.”72 The rationale underlying this factor often seems instinc-
tual: a judge should be an experienced advocate rather than a
brand-new attorney who has not gained sufficient experience to
perform judicial duties. The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan
suggests that this competence requirement demands judges
have the best academic and intellectual skills, stating that
judges must “have excellent analytical ability,” “demonstrate
excellent substantive legal knowledge, or a willingness to learn
at the earliest opportunity,” and “undertake the research neces-
sary to gain command of the facts and issues presented.”73
Of course, this factor is likely more important when consid-
ering a candidate for selection rather than retention because
judges up for retention already have experience on the bench,
so their ability to build on prior experiences to perform the
judicial role is obvious. However, even after selection, a judge
must be willing and able to continue expanding his or her
knowledge by learning and researching, as The O’Connor Judi-
cial Selection Plan explains.
5. SERVICE
Finally, as to “service,” 74 IVP explains that “[a] judge should
be committed to public service and the administration of jus-
tice.”75 A judge should be diligent and hardworking. The
judge’s motivation in fulfilling his or her duties should not be
for private gain, which would cause impropriety and improper
bias. Canon 3 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct
seems to contemplate this, providing: “A judge shall conduct
the judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the
risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office.”76
Having explained these proper considerations for judicial
selection and retention, or holding judges accountable, we turn
next to review other messages voters have sent to judges, which
were not based on these objective, neutral factors. Understand-
ing these attacks and what motivated them is essential to
understanding how to move forward; to make progress, we
must learn from the past.
IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS USED TO ATTACK THE
JUDICIARY SINCE 2010
Politically motivated attacks on state-court judges existed
before 2010,77 but 2010 was a turning point.78 As mentioned
above, voters and, more specifically, special interest groups in
Iowa used a well-funded campaign to remove three highly qual-
ified Iowa Supreme Court justices on the ballot for merit reten-
tion.79 The impetus was the court’s unanimous opinion holding
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80. Sulzberger, supra note 78.
81. Id. Of course, we now know that the Iowa justices’ decision was
legally correct—as the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2016 in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
82. Sulzberger, supra note 78.
83. Alvarez, supra note 5; Musgrave, supra note 5. This was the first
time “a political party ever [took] a position” regarding the reten-
tion of state court judges. See Robert Barnes, Republicans Target
Three Florida Supreme Court Justices, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/republica
ns-target-three-florida-supreme-court-justices/2012/10/30/
edbeb5de-1d22-11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314_story.html?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.cd266c5be2f1. 
84. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1549.
85. See generally Fla. Dep’t of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642 (Fla.
2010).
86. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1549-
50 (quoting Preserving a Fair and Impartial Judiciary, supra note 2,
at 10); see Barnes, supra note 83.
87. See Musgrave, supra note 5.
88. TV Ad: Send Them a Message, supra note 1.
89. See Canon 7C(1), Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of
Florida, supra note 36; see also A New Era for Judicial Retention
Elections, supra note 4, at 1560 & n.203.
90. Musgrave, supra note 5.
91. Barnes, supra n. 83. 
92. Yet, we would see these buzzwords again just before our constitu-
tionally required retirement in January 2019. See, e.g., Gary
Rohrer, Florida Supreme Court: Next Governor Gets to Replace Retir-
ing Justices, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/political-pulse/os-
ne-scott-appoint-justices-20181015-story.html; David Smiley,
Florida Supreme Court Ruling Raises Stakes of Governor’s Election,
MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/politics-government/state-politics/article220070010.html.
93. See TV Spending Surges Past $1.4 Million in Tennessee Judicial Race,
BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.brennan
center.org/press-release/tv-spending-surges-past-14-million-ten-
nessee-judicial-race (reporting “a national trend of increasing
expenditures on judicial elections,” especially in states that
“worked to insulate courts from political pressure by establishing
merit selection systems”). 
94. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1556-
57; Mark Binker, Big Business Spends to Unseat NC Supreme 
Court Justice Hudson, WRAL.com (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.wral.com/big-business-spends-to-unseat-nc-
supreme-court-justice-hudson/13603252/.
95. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who
Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/judge-
persky-brock-turner-recall.html.
96. Id.; accord Augie Martin, Holly Yan & Dan Merica, Voters Oust
Judge Who Gave Brock Turner 6 Months for Sex Assault, CNN (June
6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/us/judge-aaron-
persky-recall-results-brock-turner/index.html.
unconstitutional a state statute banning same-sex marriage.
While those who mounted the campaign against these
“activist” justices—who were simply performing their judicial
duty of interpreting their state constitution—celebrated the
justices’ removal as “a popular rebuke of judicial overreach,”80
removing the justices had “no effect on” the substance of the
decision that caused the attack.81 Yet, those who led the cam-
paign commented that “the results should be a warning to
judges elsewhere.”82 The message: Unpopular decisions that
ignore the will of the people jeopardize your position on the bench. 
Just two years after the successful Iowa campaign, special
interest groups struck again. As mentioned above, opposition
groups—including Americans for Prosperity and the Tea Party
through Restore Justice, and ultimately the Republican Party of
Florida83—targeted my colleagues and me when we were up
for merit retention in the 2012 election,84 urging voters to vote
“no” on our retention. Initially, they focused on a decision
from our Court striking a state constitutional ballot initiative
that was marginally about the health care mandate in the
recently passed and very controversial Affordable Care Act.85
But our opponents soon turned to a 2004 decision in a capital-
sentencing case, which they used to support their argument to
voters that we used our “own views to usurp the law and sep-
aration of powers.”86 Focusing on these decisions, our oppo-
nents launched ads labeling us as activists, legislating from the
bench, and failing to respect victims of crime87—the same buzz
words that were used against the Iowa justices in the “Send
Them a Message” ad.88
As a result of these attacks, we each decided that we should
form a “Committee of Responsible Persons,” as authorized by
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct,89 to fundraise and engage
in an educational campaign about
the purpose of merit retention. Con-
trary to the ads, we maintained that
our decisions were and would con-
tinue to be based solely on the law.90
In fact, “a study commissioned by
the Federalist Society found nothing
to support a charge of judicial
activism.”91 Unlike in Iowa, our
opponents were ultimately unsuc-
cessful and, fortunately, we were
each retained and able to continue in
our positions through our mandatory retirements.92 The mes-
sage still resonated, though: Despite the merit-retention system,
your seat is not safe from political attack.93
My concern, as seen in my own 2012 merit-retention elec-
tion, is that, by waging campaigns to remove a well-qualified
jurist, judges are forced to campaign against an undefined oppo-
nent—an even more difficult task than campaigning against a
defined opponent in an ordinary election. I am not alone in this
regard. As detailed in the law review article authored by attorney
Jim Robinson and me, political attacks on state court judiciaries
have continued—including in 2014 in Kansas and Tennessee,
and then again in Kansas in 201694—all fueled by groups
attempting to change the composition on the court under attack. 
Most recently, California voters expressed their discontent
with the judiciary in 2018 by recalling Judge Aaron Persky—
the first recall in the state in over eighty years.95 Voters
attacked Persky after he sentenced a Stanford athlete, Brock
Turner, “to just six months in jail for sexually assaulting an
unconscious woman.”96 Although Turner faced up to fourteen
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97. Christal Hayes & John Bacon, Judge Aaron Persky, Who Gave Brock
Turner Lenient Sentence in Rape Case, Recalled from Office, USA
TODAY (June 6, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2018/06/06/judge-aaron-persky-who-gave-brock-turners-lenient-
sentence-sanford-rape-case-recalled/674551002/.
98. Christine Hauser, Brock Turner Loses Appeal to Overturn Sexual
Assault Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/08/09/us/brock-turner-appeal.html.
99. Astor, supra note 95.
100. Hauser, supra note 98.
101. Id.; see Hayes & Bacon, supra note 97.
102. John Pfaff, California Ousts an Elected Judge. Everybody Loses,
WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/13/california-ousts-a-judge-
everybody-loses/?utm_term=.cd4158856239.
103. See Greytak, et al., supra note 34, at 3.
104. Berry, supra note 8, at 2.
105. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1553.
106. Mark Binker, Big Business Spends to Unseat NC Supreme Court Jus-
tice Hudson, WRAL.com (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.wral.com/
big-business-spends-to-unseat-nc-supreme-court-justice-hud-
son/13603252/; see Jefferson & Pariente, supra note 23, at 14.
107. See Binker, supra note 106.
108. E.g., id.; Tom Bullock, Controversial “Justice for All NC” PAC
Returns for Late Push on Judges, WFAE 90.7 (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.wfae.org/post/controversial-justice-all-nc-pac-
returns-late-push-judges#stream/0.
years in prison under state law,
Judge Persky sentenced him “to
only six months,” citing his “age,
the fact that both he and the vic-
tim were drunk and that prison
time could have a ‘severe’ impact
on [his] life as the reasoning
behind the lenient six-month
sentence.”97 Persky explained
that Turner also “lost his swim-
ming scholarship to Stanford and
had to register as a sex offender
in Ohio, his home state.”98
Regarding his decision, Judge Persky stated: “As a judge, my
role is to consider both sides. . . . It’s not always popular, but
it’s the law, and I took an oath to follow it without regard to
public opinion or my opinions as a former prosecutor.”99
“Judge Persky was cleared of any official misconduct,” and the
appellate court upheld Turner’s conviction.100 But, “talk of a
recall campaign began almost as soon as he handed down his
sentence. . . . In a statement filed with the county registrar in
response to” campaign efforts against him, led by the victim’s
mother, “Judge Persky said he had a legal and professional
responsibility to consider alternatives to imprisonment for
first-time offenders.”101
The Stanford case caused public outrage for several reasons.
First, the public considered Turner’s sentence, although per-
missible under the law, unreasonably short. More importantly,
many thought that the defendant’s race contributed to the
leniency in sentencing—that he was given a more lenient sen-
tence because he is white rather than black. While this concern
about racial disparities in the justice system is certainly valid,
recalling Persky may have actually undermined the quest for a
more equitable and merciful justice system. As Professor John
Pfaff, an academic who studies criminal justice, explained: “The
recall will make judges more punitive, thwart progress toward
scaling back mass incarceration and—though Turner and Per-
sky are both white—hurt minorities disproportionately.”102
Unlike the attacks in Iowa, Florida, and Tennessee, the
attack against Persky was not driven by special interests seek-
ing to change the composition of the court. Rather, the attack
against Perksy was a result of voters’ outrage caused by one of
Perksy’s sentencing decisions, made in his judicial capacity,
with which voters strongly disagreed because they viewed the
decision as insensitive to and minimizing the serious crime of
sexual assault. However, the message was similar and harmful
to a fair and impartial judiciary nonetheless. The recall of
Judge Persky was still based upon public disapproval of a judi-
cial decision that was valid under the law.
Some may argue that the message sent in the case of Judge
Persky was proper based on the circumstances. But, if the mes-
sage was proper under those circumstances, what is its logical
end point? For state court trial judges who are required to run
in judicial elections, should the judge be able to present a
“tough on crime” platform?103 In fact, many judges may
already feel this pressure. Notably, the Brennan Center
reported in 2017 that multiple studies found that judges sub-
jected to upcoming contested elections or even retention elec-
tions are “more punitive toward defendants in criminal
cases.”104
Kansas offers a useful illustration. Opposition to the 2014
and 2016 merit-retention campaigns of well-qualified Kansas
Supreme Court justices rallied around outrage by the families
of the victims in a decision granting two death row defendants
new sentencing proceedings. While the campaign was started
by the victims’ families, interest groups and the Governor
became involved and ultimately used the decision to create
attack ads accusing the Supreme Court of Kansas of siding
with murderers. As Jim Robinson and I have discussed else-
where, special interest groups and politicians seized on this
case in an attempt to change the composition of the Kansas
Supreme Court, which they considered to be “too liberal.”105
Similarly, the 2014 campaign against Justice Robin Hudson
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a well-qualified jurist,
launched ads labeling her as “not tough on child molesters”
and, even worse, “not fair.”106 But the real motivation came
from pro-business interests seeking her replacement.107 Fortu-
nately, not only were the attack ads unsuccessful in replacing
Justice Hudson, but both the local and national press became
aware of the motivations behind the campaign and explained
it widely.108 The attacks against Justice Hudson show not only
the harmful messages special interests impose on voters but
also, and more importantly, the importance of educating the
media and public on this topic so they can properly identify
and report on these attacks.
As all of these instances show, the merit-based system for
selecting and retaining judges leaves good judges and justices
vulnerable to attack by special interest groups. Some of these
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sions be “constitutionally based” and “representative of the com-
munity to be served by the judge”).
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commission (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). Before 2001, Florida’s
JNC was composed of three members appointed by the Florida
Bar, three members appointed by the Governor, and three mem-
bers selected and appointed by a majority vote of the other six
members. § 43.291, Fla. Stat. (2000). However, in 2001, the
Florida Legislature changed the statute to the system Florida uses
today, under which Florida’s Governor appoints five of the nine
JNC members.  For the other four members, the Florida Bar sub-
mits names to the Governor to accept or reject—essentially giving
the Governor ultimate control over all nine seats on the JNC. §
43.291, Fla. Stat. (2001); ch. 2001-282, Laws of Fla. In 2018,
when there were three upcoming vacancies on the Supreme Court
of Florida, political influence on the JNC was at the forefront of
discussion. See, e.g., Lloyd Dunkelberger, Ron DeSantis Gets List of
Conservative Nominees for Florida Supreme Court Vacancies,
ORLANDO WEEKLY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.orlando
weekly.com/Blogs/archives/2018/11/28/ron-desantis-gets-list-of-
conservative-nominees-for-florida-supreme-court-vacancies.
117. Judicial Nominating Information, Vt. Judiciary, https://www.vermont
judiciary.org/attorneys/judicial-nominating-information.
attacks have even been successful in sending messages to
judges that have no place in the judicial branch, the one
branch of government designed to be free from improper influ-
ence.109 As the Defense Research Institute has stated: “The
unique position of the judiciary stems in part from the long-
standing commitment to the American people to the rule of
law and to constitutional government.”110
POTENTIAL WAYS TO IMPROVE THE MERIT-BASED 
SYSTEM
So, what can we do to ensure that American voters, and the
public at large, understand and evaluate judges based on proper
characteristics—as outlined above—rather than the improper
motivations that have led to former attacks? As Alicia Bannon,
Deputy Director for Program Management of the Brennan Cen-
ter, observed, “there is far more agreement on the problems
associated with judicial elections than on potential reforms.”111
While others may disagree, it seems clear that, while certain
aspects of the system may certainly be improved, a merit-based
system is the preferred method for judicial selection and reten-
tion. Thus, I start with the premise, which may be controversial
among some in the judiciary and legal profession, that election
of state court judges and justices—whether partisan or non-
partisan—always creates the real risk of politicizing the judi-
ciary and subjecting the judiciary to special interest influence.
Both the Brennan Center and The O’Connor Judicial Selection
Plan, as well as other organizations,112 have invested many
resources in determining best practices and creating proposals
for reforming the merit-selection and -retention systems. Having
reviewed the literature and personally experienced these unwel-
come attacks, I agree that, at the least, we should (1) review how
judicial nominating commissions (JNCs) are composed and
instructed, (2) maintain a vigorous judicial qualifications com-
mittee (JQC) process to ensure accountability, (3) consider a
system of judicial evaluations, such as the one in Arizona, pro-
vided it can be truly non-partisan, and last but not least (4) con-
currently provide an effective forum to continue to educate the
public, the media, and voters on
judges up for retention election.
In the end, I am in favor of a
true merit-based system for all
levels of judges with a properly
constituted and nonpartisan
JNC as well as a vigorous JQC to
monitor complaints about judi-
cial conduct. I also believe we
should consider one lengthy
term for judges, without reten-
tion, as the Brennan Center has
proposed.113
1. REVIEWING THE 
COMPOSITION AND INSTRUCTION OF JNCS
First, political influence must be removed (or at least mini-
mized) from every step of the judicial selection and retention
process, beginning with the JNC. Each state’s JNC and JQC is
specifically tasked with ensuring that judges and justices are
properly vetted before selection and that they comply with the
appropriate code of judicial conduct while in office. As former
Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, Ruth V. McGregor,
explained, the JNC “is the key to the judicial merit selection
process.”114 Likewise, the independence of JNCs is critical.
Thus, I agree with the Brennan Center and The O’Connor Judi-
cial Selection Plan that we should rethink how JNCs are com-
posed and instructed.115
For example, in states like Florida, the Governor appoints
each member of the JNC, resulting in the likelihood of a more
partisan commission that, in turn, selects the list of the candi-
dates from which the Governor appoints judges or justices.116
In Vermont, by contrast, the eleven-member JNC is appointed
as follows: three members appointed by the Bar; two members
appointed by the Governor; three members appointed by the
Senate; and three members appointed by the House.117 Ver-
mont’s system seems to diversify the interests at stake better
Court Review - Volume 55 25
So, what can we
do to ensure the
American voters,
and the public at
large, understand
and evaluate
judges based 
on proper 
characteristics 
. . . ?
118. Judicial Nominating Commission, Ky. Ct. Justice (2018),
https://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JNC/Pages/default
.aspx.
119. Judicial Nominating Commission Fact Sheet, In. Judicial Branch,
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/2920.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2018).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Inquiry Concerning a Judge RE: John Patrick Contini, No. SC18-
1189 (Fla.); Inquiry Concerning a Judge RE: Stephen Thomas
Millan, No. SC18-775 (Fla.); Inquiry Concerning a Judge RE:
Claudia Robinson, No. SC17-2093 (Fla.); Inquiry Concerning a
Judge RE: Mark Hulsey, III, No. SC16-1278.
124. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 16-534 RE: Dana Marie Santino,
43 FLA. L. WEEKLY S477 (Fla. Oct. 19, 2018); Inquiry Concern-
ing a Judge No. 16-377 RE: Scott C. Dupont, 252 So. 3d 1130
(Fla. 2018).
125. See JPR Process, AZ Cts., https://www.azcourts.gov/jpr/About-
JPR/JPR-Process (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, supra note 40, at 7.
actions,123 and two judges were removed by the Supreme Court
of Florida after a JQC action.124
3. JUDICIAL EVALUATIONS
Third, we should consider implementing a system of judicial
evaluation, such as the system used by Arizona and proposed
by The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan. In Arizona, each judge
is evaluated twice during his or her term—“once at midterm
and once at the end of the term just before the general election.
The review is a two-part process.”125 As part of the data collec-
tion and reporting stage, the Judicial Performance Review (JPR)
Commission distributes and collects surveys by “people who
have contact with the judges during a prescribed time period,”
“holds public hearings,” and “accepts written comments from
the public at any time.”126 Then, as part of the self-evaluation
and improvement stage, the “[j]udges complete self-evaluations
to rate their own performance,” using categories identical to
those used in the surveys.127
After compiling the data, the JPR Commission determines
whether the judge “Meets” or “Does Not Meet” the judicial
performance standards, which include whether the judge:
• administer[s] justice fairly, ethically, uniformly, promptly
and efficiently;
• [is] free from personal bias when making decisions and
decide[s] cases based on the proper application of law;
• issue[s] prompt rulings that can be understood and make[s]
decisions that demonstrate competent legal analysis;
• act[s] with dignity, courtesy and patience; and
• effectively manage[s] their courtrooms and the administra-
tive responsibilities of their office.128
Ultimately, the JPR Commission’s findings are made avail-
able to the public.129
Similarly, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan proposes a
judicial performance evaluation system that would “publically
[sic] disseminate regular evaluations of the performance of
individual judges, based on criteria generally understood to be
characteristics of a good judge.”130 The O’Connor Judicial Selec-
tion Plan defines those criteria as follows:
• Command of relevant substantive law and procedural rules
• Impartiality and freedom from bias
• Clarity of oral and written communications
• Judicial temperament that demonstrates appropriate respect
than systems like Florida’s,
which, in turn, decreases the risk
of politicizing the judiciary.
There are many options. Sys-
tems like Kentucky’s and Indi-
ana’s even involve voters,
although the process is more par-
tisan in Kentucky. There, the JNC
is composed of “the chief justice
of Kentucky (who also serves as
chair), two attorneys elected by
all attorneys in the vacancy’s jurisdiction and four non-attor-
ney Kentucky citizens who are appointed by the governor. The
four citizens must equally represent the two major political
parties.”118
Similarly, Indiana’s seven-member JNC consists of three
attorneys, three non-lawyers, “and the Chief Justice of Indiana
or a Justice of the Supreme Court whom the Chief Justice may
designate.”119 One attorney and one non-attorney are chosen
to represent “each of three geographic districts of the Court of
Appeals.”120 The attorney members “serve three-year stag-
gered terms, after being elected by the attorneys in their
respective districts.121 The Governor appoints the non-attor-
ney members, one from each of the Districts, to serve three-
year terms.”122
Indiana’s JNC-selection process seems to more effectively
reduce political influence, which is critical, by ensuring that
each geographical area is represented, including a combination
of attorneys and non-attorneys, as well as the Chief Justice,
and involving the public. As The O’Connor Judicial Selection
Plan explains, reducing political influence at this stage will
help reduce any political influence that could arise in the next
stage—gubernatorial appointment—as Governors are natu-
rally political actors who are elected by voters to lead the state’s
executive branch.
2. MAINTAINING VIGOROUS JQCS
Second, we must ensure that each state’s JQC remains inde-
pendent and impartial. JQCs are critical in ensuring that
judges are held accountable for violating judicial codes of con-
duct. As the cases of Judges Millan, Mulsey, and Santino illus-
trate, the JQCs are an effective way to ensure accountability
under the judicial codes of conduct. In Florida, for example,
the JQC has caused the removal or resignation of six judges
since 2017—four judges resigned, voluntarily dismissing JQC
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for everyone in the courtroom
• Administrative skills, including competent docket manage-
ment
• Appropriate public outreach131
Implementing plans similar to these would ensure a non-
partisan, objective review of judicial performance, which
would, in turn, provide feedback to judges and, more impor-
tantly, educate voters on the proper criteria by which judges
should be reviewed for retention.
4. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Finally, it is important to create forums for voter education
on judges who appear on the ballot for merit retention. As the
IVP’s purpose indicates and the example from North Carolina
illustrates, voter education is critical. The ABA and IVP have
started this process. In 2005, the ABA appointed a Commission
on Civic Education and the Separation of Powers.132 Also, the
ABA’s Standing Committee on the American Judicial System
states in its mission statement that it “supports efforts to
increase public understanding about the role of the judiciary
and the importance of fair courts within American democ-
racy.”133 More specifically, the Subcommittee on State Courts
“supports efforts to increase public understanding of judicial
selection and retention methods and to increase informed citi-
zen participation in states where judges are subject to election
of any kind.”134
IVP provides educational materials—slide presentations,
handouts, etc.—on their website that can be used for making
presentations to the public, organizing presentations at law
schools and universities, coordinating outreach efforts, and
presenting at bar association events.135 Other organizations
have also recognized the importance of education in the mis-
sion to reduce improper influence on judicial selection and
retention.136 Ultimately, regardless of legislative change, voter
education is critical in ensuring that judges are evaluated
“about procedural fairness, demeanor, and knowledge—not
about particular outcomes in individual cases.”137
CONCLUSION
In creating the judiciary as a separate and co-equal branch
of government, our Founders understood the importance of a
fair and impartial judiciary—one
that does not bend to the will of
the majority, the other two
branches of government, or spe-
cial interests. In the end, state
court judges, without a system
comparable to federal judges’ life-
time appointments (or at least a
defined lengthy term) will always
be vulnerable to removal, or fear
of removal, for rendering
“unpopular” decisions, or those
disapproved by public opinion,
special interests, or the other
political branches.138 Yet state
courts review 95% of all cases in
the United States.139
So how do we as members of the legal profession and judi-
ciary balance accountability with judicial independence? It is
not through campaigns to remove judges who render decisions
with which members of the public, political parties, or special
interests disagree. The primary vehicle for judicial account-
ability—ensuring compliance with codes of judicial conduct
and imposing consequences for misconduct—should be each
state’s judicial qualifications commission. In addition, an inde-
pendent evaluation commission such as the one constituted in
Arizona, if truly nonpartisan, could be charged with periodi-
cally evaluating each judge on the basis of objective, appropri-
ate criteria, such as those explained in this article: integrity,
professional competence, judicial temperament, experience,
and service. 
Further, increasing voter education on judicial elections
and retention, ensuring that judicial nominating commissions
for merit-selection states are appointed to ensure balance and
focus on the merit of the applicants, implementing nonparti-
san, objective evaluations, considering the elimination of
merit-retention elections in favor of one lengthy term, and
ensuring the viability of state judicial qualifications commis-
sions are all proper areas of focus. In the end, a process where
highly qualified attorneys and judges are selected through a
nonpartisan and independent commission, even while the
Governor ultimately selects from that list, is the best way to
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ensure that the public gets what it deserves: a highly qualified
and fair and impartial judiciary.  
I continue to urge that lawyers and judges become actively
involved in defending our judiciary. I also urge the media,
through a free and independent press, to become educated
about these issues so they can effectively inform the public of
the proper considerations when judges are up for retention, as
well as the actual special interests behind the attacks on well-
qualified judges.140 At the same time, it is important to main-
tain ongoing civic education initiatives in schools, colleges,
and for the general public. While I remain concerned about
whether all of these groups, individually or collectively, can
stem the tide—especially from those who would reduce mes-
sages to either a 30-second sound bite or, worse, a 280-charac-
ter Tweet—we have no choice but to put forth our best con-
certed efforts. Nothing less than “justice” and the fundamental
tenets of our Democracy are at stake.141
Justice Barbara J. Pariente graduated from
George Washington Law School in 1973 with
highest honors. After clerking for a federal dis-
trict court judge, she began a career in private
practice in civil litigation where she earned an
AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell. Through
Florida’s constitutional system of merit selec-
tion, she became an appellate judge in 1993 and
then, again through merit selection, was appointed in 1998 to the
Supreme Court of Florida, where she served through her recent
mandatory retirement in January 2019. She served as Florida’s
Chief Justice from 2004-2006. Throughout her judicial career, she
has promoted the importance of upholding and advancing a fair
and impartial judiciary and has served as co-chair of the National
Association of Women Judges Informed Voters/Fair Judges Project:
http:www.nawj.ivp.org. As a result of these efforts, Justice Pariente
was recently awarded the Justice Sandra Day O’Connor Award for
Judicial Independence by the American College of Trial Lawyers.
Justice Barbara J. Pariente, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.florida
supremecourt.org/justices/pariente.shtml (last visited Nov. 30,
2018).
Melanie Kalmanson graduated magna cum
laude from the Florida State University College
of Law in 2016.  During her last semester of
law school, she served as an Extern in Justice
Pariente’s chambers. In August 2016, Ms.
Kalmanson began her term as Justice Pariente’s
Staff Attorney, where she served through Justice
Pariente’s recent retirement. Upon Justice Pari-
ente’s retirement, Ms. Kalmanson joined a Tallahassee law firm as
a Litigation Associate.
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The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural 
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The 
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the 
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
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Footnotes
1. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS (2009); MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES (2014);
HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT (2015).
2. Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the
Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911 (2006).
3. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who
Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual Assault, NEW YORK TIMES (June
6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/judge-
persky-brock-turner-recall.html
4. BONNEAU & HALL, supra n. 1.
5. G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES (2012)
6. Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive
Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 921 (2002).
7. Alyse Face, Judges Should Be Accountable to the Law, Not Public
Opinion, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 17, 2014)
https:/ /www.brennancenter.org/blog/judges-should-be-
accountable-law-not-public-opinion.
Under what conditions should judges be held account-able to their constituents for the decisions they make?In framing our question as we have we are immediately
tipping our hand on two crucial issues: (1) we assume that
judges have constituents, which is, of course, technically true
of more than 90% of American judges, and (2) we imply that
under at least some conditions, accountability is not only
appropriate but required by most theories of liberal democ-
racy.1 Our arguments run as follows:
• In many areas of law, including sentencing, judges are given
by statute an enormous amount of discretion. 
• When law authorizes discretion, law no longer indicates
what specific decision should be made. Any decision that
falls within the range of discretion authorized by law must
be judged to be compatible with the rule-of-law. 
• Judges may base their discretionary decisions on many fac-
tors, including expertise, their own ideological predilec-
tions, their own self-interest, the interests of the workgroup
of which they are a member, and the preferences and inter-
ests of their constituents, to name just a few salient factors.
• The factors upon which judges base their decisions may con-
flict with one another. For instance, when it comes to sen-
tencing, the interests of the courtroom workgroup may clash
with the interests and preferences of the judge’s constituents. 
• References to constituents’ preferences and interests as
“whims” or in other ways irrational are practically never
accompanied by evidence pertaining to the nature of those
preferences and interests. It is improper to assume away a
role in decision making for judges’ constituents by such
prejudicial and entirely non-evidence-based assertions.
• Under a number of conditions, it is appropriate for judges
to base their discretionary decisions on the interests and
preferences of their constituents. Doing so poses no conflict
with hallowed principles such as the rule-of-law.
THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
What do we mean when we ask whether judges should be
“accountable” to the public? Judicial accountability encom-
passes judicial responsibility for the conduct of judges as a
whole, for their behavior on and off the bench, and for the con-
tent of their rulings.2 Few would argue, for example, that
judges should not be held accountable for mismanagement of
institutional resources or for violating canons of judicial ethics.
At least as institutional and behavioral notions of accountabil-
ity are concerned, that judges should be held responsible for
their actions seems beyond dispute.
But those are not the only types of accountability. The con-
versation around judicial accountability tends to focus on deci-
sional accountability: the notion that it is good to hold judges
responsible for specific decisions or sets of decisions that they
make. As it concerns Judge Persky’s situation in California,
many of Persky’s constituents who were unhappy with the sen-
tence Persky gave to Turner exercised decisional judicial
accountability when they voted against him at the ballot box.
So too did Persky’s supporters who found Turner’s sentence to
be appropriate.3 Critics of judicial elections oftentimes rebuke
voter decision making and judicial campaigning on notions of
judicial accountability. Many political scientists take a different
view, arguing that such campaigns can provide valuable infor-
mation to voters who are inclined to hold judges accountable
for the decisions they make.4
Judicial accountability is often juxtaposed against judicial
independence.5 Our notion of judicial independence is simple:
judicial independence provides judges with the discretion to
decide cases the way they believe a case should be decided.
Judges who are not independent must decide cases in ways
that they believe are incorrect for either personal or political
reasons. In some countries, for example, judges risk death or
replacement if they rule against the government;6 under these
circumstances, judges lack judicial independence. 
While it is sometimes fashionable to say that judges who are
independent are “accountable to the law,” that need not be the
case.7 Independence simply means that judges are able to make
decisions without fear of reprisal. In doing so, judges may
decide on the basis of many factors, including the law, exper-
tise, their own ideological predilections, their own self-interest
(including ambitions), the interests of the workgroup of which
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they are a member, and the preferences and interests of their
constituents, to name just a few salient factors. Judicial inde-
pendence may contribute to rule-of-law outcomes, but does
not necessarily do so (e.g., judges who base their decisions
solely on their own ideologies).8
Moreover, the relationship between judicial elections and
judicial independence has changed over time. While many
now argue that judicial elections reduce judicial independence,
that has not always been the case. For example, judicial elec-
tions were originally adopted in the mid-1800s as a means of
increasing judicial independence, based upon fears that judges
were too accountable to the state legislators and party leaders
who recommended and appointed them.9 Likewise, Bolivians
adopted judicial elections in 2009 for their national high
courts based upon a promise that judicial elections would
increase judicial independence and reduce corruption.10
Of course, these two concepts have been the subject of volu-
minous debates among legal scholars, and our description here
only scratches the surface of the tension between judicial inde-
pendence and judicial accountability.11 The key points of this
discussion for our argument are simply that judicial indepen-
dence increases opportunities for judges to rely upon whatever
factors they would like—be those legal or otherwise—to make
decisions. And, while decisional accountability is often criti-
cized, the basic notion of judicial accountability for other types
of judicial behaviors is relatively straightforward: just because
someone is a judge does not mean they should not be held
responsible for their conduct.
THE AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Judges’ decisions are sometimes said to be incompatible
with the rule of law. But we contend that any decision autho-
rized by statute or precedent or rules of equity is one that is
compatible with the rule of law. Those who criticize judges’
decisions as inconsistent with the rule of law are often doing
nothing more than declaring that they disagree with the deci-
sion. In reality, judicial decision making is difficult to judge
because judges are gifted with unbelievable amounts of discre-
tion.12 This is not particularly surprising; almost every judicial
decision, of almost every type, involves a choice between alter-
native outcomes. And, anyone with even a cursory knowledge
of the opinions of high courts knows that judges often disagree
about which of those alternative outcomes is correct. As much
as Supreme Court nominees like to hail their affinity for call-
ing “balls and strikes,” the craft of judging is discretionary and
difficult, and we observe many good-faith disagreements
among competent and qualified judges about how a case
should be resolved.13
What explains these dis-
agreements? In some cases, law
is very clear and constrains the
legitimate outcomes a judge can
reach. If a road has a speed limit
of 25 miles per hour and a driver
is clocked by a police officer
(who is using a correctly cali-
brated tool) as operating her or
his motor vehicle at 40 miles per
hour, a judge has relatively little
discretion in how the defen-
dant’s speeding ticket should be resolved. In the absence of facts
to the contrary, the defendant has committed the crime of speed-
ing. The law is clear in that case.
Most cases are not that easy. Typically, the law is indetermi-
nate, providing judges with legitimate discretion that supports
a range of possible outcomes. This is true with regard to
choices on concepts ranging from “commonality” to “reason-
ableness.” As Judge Cardozo put it in his famous lecture on
The Nature of the Judicial Process:
The decision-making freedom that judges have is an
involuntary freedom. It is the consequence of legalism’s
inability in many cases to decide the outcome… That
inability… create[s] an open area in which judges have
decisional discretion—a blank slate on which to inscribe
their decisions—rather than being compelled to a partic-
ular decision by “the law.”14
In other words, the law is not clear in many cases, leaving
even the most careful judges a window of discretion. Consider,
for example, constitutional provisions like “reasonable”
searches and seizure, “cruel” punishment, or an “adequate”
education. These clauses are ripe with vagueness; in these cir-
cumstances, judges’ interpretations of the law give them dis-
cretion based on the meaning of the provision or statute they
must interpret. 
Trial judges, in particular, have an extreme amount of dis-
cretion in their day-to-day work. These judges make discre-
tionary decisions about what evidence to admit, which wit-
nesses to believe, which jurors to seat, and which requests of
the lawyers to grant. All of these decisions typically involve
judgment calls based on credibility, a concept that is extraordi-
narily subjective. In short, even when carrying out their day-
to-day jobs, judges exercise a great deal of discretion.
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In still other cases, the law
expressly provides judges with dis-
cretion. This is obviously true
when judges sentence a defen-
dant, authorizing them to give, for
example, a fine and/or a period of
probation or a lengthy prison sen-
tence. And many of those statutes
are accompanied by specific grants
of discretion in terms of the sever-
ity of a sentence.15 While specific aggregating or mitigating
factors might be authorized by statute, determining whether or
not those factors have been satisfied is often another grant of
discretion. Again, this seems uncontroversial: that judges are
so rarely found to have abused their discretion speaks to the
conclusion that judicial discretion is, practically speaking, vir-
tually unbounded. 
THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE JUDICIAL DISCRETION
If judicial discretion is, as we have argued, an inevitable part
of the judicial process, then what factors should guide that dis-
cetion? To begin, there are some features that clearly should
not influence judicial behavior because they undermine the
rule of law. The easiest example is a bribe. Even if a decision
may be authorized by law (e.g., the defendant is statutorily
authorized to receive probation), the process leading to the
decision (the bribe) may render the decision illegitimate as a
violation of the rule of law. And we of course recognize that,
while bribery is not much of an issue in contemporary U.S.
judicial politics, it is not so unbelievable outside the geo-
graphic confines of this country. Here, campaign contributions
are an issue, and some believe that basing one’s decision on
campaign contributions is illegitimate and a violation of the
rule of law.16 This then means that how a decision is made
(procedurally proper) is important beyond the specific out-
come embraced by judges.
Still, that extralegal factors may legitimately influence judi-
cial decision making is not as strange as it may first appear.
Consider the use of legislative intent to interpret a statute.
Many judges and legal scholars believe that judges should
defer to the interpretation of a text as it was originally drafted;
by that view, judges’ discretion should be curtailed by neither
the law (strictly speaking) nor their own personal views but
rather by outsourcing interpretation of a statute or constitu-
tional provision to its original authors (or, in some instances,
to a presidential signing statement).
Or consider interpersonal dynamics among judges. Judges
on collegial courts decide cases in groups, and it is only natural
that the unique personal information they bring to the bench
might change how their colleagues exercise their discretion in
some cases.17 Justice Ginsburg made this point well when dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s deliberations in a case involving
the strip search of a 13-year-old girl by her teachers: “They
have never been a 13-year-old girl.… It’s a very sensitive age
for a girl. I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite
understood.” After she explained to her colleagues “the trauma
such a search would have on a developing adolescent,” Gins-
burg was able to persuade her colleagues to rule that the
school’s search was unconstitutional.18 In this way, judges’
exercise of discretion might sometimes be affected by the per-
sonal views and experiences of their colleagues.
DISCRETION AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
Naïve understandings of judicial independence sometimes
suggest that judicial independence is nothing more than decid-
ing cases independent of public opinion. As we have argued
above, this is not true. Indeed, sometimes the statutes directly
ask justices to consider public opinion. Consider Roper v. Sim-
mons (2005): “To implement this framework we have estab-
lished the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to
‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”19 Or, to take
another example, the Miller test for obscenity asks judges to
consider: (1) whether “the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards” would find that the work,
“taken as a whole,” appeals to “prurient interests,” (2) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(3) whether the work, “taken as a whole,” lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.20 These are all cases in
which judges are specifically asked to consider what their con-
stituents might believe about a case.
Even when public opinion is not expressly implicated in the
law, there are many scenarios in which judges might quite rea-
sonably take into account the preferences of their constituents
in making their decisions. For instance:
• When the public turned against the war in Vietnam, sen-
tences for draft evasion could quite reasonably be changed
from prison time to probation under the theory that dwin-
dling support for the war no longer justified incarcerating
those who opposed the war. 
• To combat the gun epidemic in Chicago, judges could quite
reasonably announce that they intend to double the aver-
age sentence for gun-related crimes, based on the belief
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that responding to the fear of gun violence is reasonable
and that increasing penalties are likely to deter gun-toting
behavior. 
• As a means of “sending a message,” a judge could quite rea-
sonably sentence Martha Stewart to prison time for insider
trading on the stock market, this time under the theory that
majoritarian institutions decided to ban certain trading
behavior, and without meaningful enforcement and serious
penalties, the purposes of the law would be defeated.  
• When citizens vote to legalize some forms of marijuana,
judges could quite reasonably change their sentencing
behavior to give less serious sentences to those convicted of
marijuana crimes because, as a mala prohibita crime, the
definition of what constitutes a crime is to some degree
arbitrary, with whatever people think is criminal being
treated as criminal. 
• Judges who ride a circuit—especially one made up of both
rural and urban counties—could quite reasonably adjust
their sentences to take into account the degree to which a
crime constitutes a moral affront to the instant community. 
• Judges pressed to address the widespread culture of sexual
assault could quite reasonably issue sentences that assuage
the legitimate concerns among their constituents that
potential perpetrators need strong deterrents to get them to
change their behavior.
LIMITS ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
We do not necessarily argue that sentences in instant cases
should consider the preferences of the judge’s constituents. But
sentences in the aggregate constitute public policy. For judges
to say that they are changing the “going rate” for particular
crimes because their constituents are worried about the crime
does not strike us as being in the least inappropriate. Or cer-
tainly it is no more inappropriate than listening to the voices
of those who say that current penalties are unfair and too
severe.
Sentencing is a different type of judicial decision, one asso-
ciated with an enormous degree of authorized discretion. We
do not argue that judges should ignore mandatory sentences if
their constituents oppose them.21 But we see no valid argu-
ments supporting the view that judges who listen to the gen-
eral sentencing preferences of their constituents are acting
improperly. Certainly, no one could rightly judge sentences
informed by the value priorities of the judge’s constituents a
violation of the rule of law. 
It is pure fantasy to suggest that, out of a range of 0 to 30
years, there is a “correct” decision, and that the judge is
uniquely in a position to know what that “correct” decision is.
Instead, we know from decades of
research on criminal courts that the
interests of the “courtroom work-
group” play an outsized role in the
decisions of that workgroup. Is it
appropriate to sentence on the basis
of a workgroup’s “going rates” for
individual crimes? What about tak-
ing into consideration the degree of
overcrowding in the prisons? Or
perhaps enhancing a sentence
because the defendant pled inno-
cent and therefore required the time, effort, and expense of a
jury trial? Or to issue lesser sentences to the clients of an attor-
ney who makes campaign contributions to the judge to get
assignments to represent indigent defendant? Much discussion
of sentencing seems to suggest that there is a “correct” sen-
tencing decision—or at least one that is best justified by the
need of the convicted for “rehabilitation.” But American pris-
ons generally fail in their rehabilitative function, and sentenc-
ing decisions are often more likely to represent the needs of the
workgroup than the needs of the convicted. 
Research on the sentencing decisions of Kansas judges
offers a useful case study of the conflict between the needs of
the criminal court workgroup and the preferences of the
judges’ constituents. 
THE SENTENCING BEHAVIOR OF KANSAS JUDGES
Much has been made of the findings that judges change their
behavior over the course of the electoral cycle—scholars are
particularly concerned about the research findings of Huber
and Gordon, Gordon and Huber, and Berdejó and Yuchtman.22
The assumption is that decisions made in proximity to an elec-
tion are improper (the word “pander” is often used) and that
decisions made outside the electoral period (however defined)
are proper. To be clear, “proper” and “improper” are normative
judgments, not empirical findings. All the data themselves
show is that the behavior differs at different points-in-time. For
instance, “when election is imminent, judges in competitive
districts are 7.1%. . . .more likely to sentence a convict to time
in prison and, conditional on incarceration, assign sentences
6.3 months longer than their counterparts in retention dis-
tricts.”23 In general, some scholars are much concerned about
serious bias against criminal defendants in states that elect their
judges. We, however, are less concerned.
For simplicity, let us assume two periods of decision mak-
ing—a period under external scrutiny (the election period)
and a period not under external scrutiny (the non-election
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period). What we mean by “exter-
nal” is that in the period not
under scrutiny, the courtroom
workgroup (the prosecutor, the
defense attorney, and the judge) is
able to implement its preferences
without constraint. Assume for a
moment that prosecutors are
motivated by producing as high a “conviction rate” as possible,
defense attorneys (and defendants) primarily want no jail time,
and judges shoot for a record of not ever being overturned on
appeal. All of these motivations fuel the plea-bargaining
process. 
Now, few have ever argued that the sentences handed out
under plea bargaining are rationally designed. Crimes typically
are associated with a “going rate,” around which increments
and decrements are sought. An important goal of the process is
conflict minimization and maintenance of the relationships
among the repeat players—the courtroom workgroup. Under
these circumstances, the average sentence for a second convic-
tion on burglary might be on the order of four years, a very far
cry indeed from the maximum sentence for the crime provided
by the state legislature (a parameter that so many decry as an
unreasonable, even if largely irrelevant, decision by a majori-
tarian institution). 
Our point is simple. Assume Huber and Gordon are correct
about temporal variability in sentencing. Could it not be that
the sentences issued under periods without scrutiny are sen-
tences that primarily serve the benefits of the courtroom work-
group, and that those sentences are “too low” (whatever that
means)? When under scrutiny, the actors in the workgroup are
compelled to consider societal interests more strongly, and
therefore cannot “give away the store” just to secure a guilty
plea from a defendant. To treat sentences in the non-electoral
period as somehow more rational (e.g., tailored to fit the reha-
bilitation needs of the defendant) does not at all fit with the
reality of plea bargaining in American criminal courts. If the
workgroup is simply negotiating self-serving sentences in the
non-election period, then the scrutiny that comes during the
electoral period may actually be desirable from the point-of-
view of the public good.  
Let us assume that the constituents generally want a sen-
tence of +6 months, or, more precisely, +6.3 months. We take
this figure from the finding of Gordon and Huber that judges
in competitive districts in Kansas “assign sentences 6.3 months
longer than their counterparts in retention districts.”24 Clearly,
many observers view this additional 6.3 months as undesir-
able. But the only criterion they apparently use to make this
judgment is that of defendant preferences. We completely
agree that it is reasonable to assume that convicted criminals
would prefer to spend X months in jail rather than X + 6.3
months in jail. 
So, convicted criminal defendants want less jail time and
constituents want more.25 Without some ancillary theoretical
apparatus, it is not at all clear to us why the preferences of the
defendants should be treated as superior to the preferences of
the constituents.  
We should readily admit that we do not necessarily agree
with the view that guilty criminal defendants are somehow
entitled to lenient sentences. We would not, for example, nec-
essarily object to a convicted burglar getting 5.6 years of incar-
ceration rather than 5.0 years. We would not agree with a sen-
tence outside the range of available penalties proscribed by
statute (of course). More generally, we would most likely agree
with sentencing decisions that are transparent and subject to
scrutiny. But simply to say that +6.3 months is somehow
wrong, and because it is wrong, the method of selecting judges
is wrong, strikes us as entirely too simplistic. 
What if the people of Kansas realized how expensive it is to
incarcerate convicts and therefore shifted to a preference of 
-6.3 months for the average sentence? Would it be appropriate
for the sentencing judges to respond to these changed prefer-
ences? If so, then the culprit critics identify is not necessarily
judges responding to the preferences of their constituents
(because they are elected, not appointed), but rather that the
constituents currently hold “bad” preferences. It that is true,
then perhaps the palliative is to change the constituents, not
the methods of selecting judges.  
“PANDERING?”
Scholars who write about the role of public opinion in court
decisions often use the word “pander” when referring to incor-
porating constituent preferences into the factors guiding the
exercise of judicial discretion. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, the verb “pander” refers “to act as a pander; to min-
ister to the immoral urges or distasteful desires of another;” or,
“in weakened use: to indulge the tastes, whims, or weaknesses
of another.”26 Critics use this term, we suspect, under the
assumption that the preferences of the constituents are ill-
informed, or just simply irrational. We strongly suspect that
many who read the Huber and Gordon findings are disgusted
that the American people unreasonably seem to prefer more
punitive rather than less punitive sentences. This is just one
more charge in what is often a comprehensive indictment of
the American people for being know-nothing dolts when it
comes to law and politics. 
Many have argued that judges ought not to “pander” to the
“whims” of their constituents. Of course, framing the question
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sentencing or other policy decisions, just as (we hope) no one
argues for complete judicial independence—or that the life
terms of the highly unaccountable U.S. Supreme Court justices
should be expanded to other judicial officers. No one argues
that the majority ought to get its way in all policy decisions,
judicial or otherwise; and we are not sanguine about the diffi-
culty of specifying when the majority has the right to get its
way and when minority rights must trump majority prefer-
ences. Clearly, there must be constraints on the degree of
accountability and constraints on the degree of independence.  
But we do argue that a large number of policy decisions
made by judges ought not to ignore the preferences of the
judges’ constituents. The enforceability of mandatory arbitra-
tion terms in contracts that nearly all do not read and do not
understand is not an issue, for example, on which the prefer-
ences of the American people ought to be ignored. And, we
contend, there is absolutely nothing wrong in a democracy that
decides its judges should be elected and in which the con-
stituents of the judges vote on the basis of whether they agree
with the policy decisions of the judicial candidates. For judges
to hide behind judicial independence, unsupported claims to
the superiority of judicial judgments over the preferences of
the constituents, and distain for the rationality of public opin-
ion is unwarranted. 
James L. Gibson holds the Sidney W. Souers
Professor of Government chair in the Depart-
ment of Political Science at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis. He also holds the title of Pro-
fessor Extraordinary in Political Science at
Stellenbosch University in South Africa, where
is also a Fellow in the Centre for Comparative
and International Politics. His most recent
book, co-authored with Michael J. Nelson, is titled Black and Blue
(Oxford) and is an account of the degree of and nature of the legit-
imacy that black Americans extend to the U.S. legal system. 
Michael J. Nelson is Jeffrey L. Hyde and Sharon
D. Hyde and Political Science Board of Visitors
Early Career Professor in Political Science,
Associate Professor of Political Science and
Social Data Analytics, and Affiliate Law Fac-
ulty at Pennsylvania State University. He stud-
ies public support for the legal system, judicial
behavior, and how judicial elections affect the
development of the law.
in this fashion prejudges the conclusion. It assumes that con-
stituents do not have meaningful policy preferences and that to
respond to these meaningless preferences is to gratify or
indulge an immoral or distasteful desire, need, or habit or a
person with such a desire. We do not in this essay speak in
favor of pandering.
Constituents differ—and differ legitimately—on what they
view the function of sentencing to be (just as scholars and pol-
icy makers differ). Some may favor general deterrence, while
others seek special deterrence. Some may favor retributive jus-
tice; others seek restorative justice. Some may view the role
and preferences of the victim to be determinative; others may
think that victims ought to be excluded from the sentencing
process. 
Constituents also have many legal policy preferences that
are a far cry from being whims. Attitudes toward abortion, for
instance, are often grounded in considered moral ideologies,
and are also often informed by science and medicine.27 The
belief that harsher sentences will deter crime may or may not
be entirely supported by scientific evidence, but because it is
not does not mean that it is a whim that can be ignored (just
as, out of faith, many scientists believe that life as we know it
must exist somewhere in the universe). Relatedly, the position
that the only way to stop sexual assaults in this country is by
stepped-up prosecutions and lengthy and harsh penalties may
be derived after considerable thought and deliberation. Simi-
larly, the judgment that employment-at-will is an antiquated
and unfair legal doctrine can be a considered view that is well
grounded in other beliefs. Even the political preference that
Americans should withdraw all troops from Afghanistan
should hardly be treated, on its face, as a whim to which pres-
idents and legislators ought not to pander. Ordinary people
hold views on legal issues that may not be embedded in a well-
articulated and logical ideological frameworks, but that does
not mean that their preferences on issues such as issuing sen-
tences of life imprisonment without parole or seizing private
property for private development are whimsical, ill-informed,
or unreasonable. 
Finally, those who make the “whim” and “pandering” argu-
ments typically (if not always) produce not a scintilla of proof
in support of their views. How does one determine whether
public opinion is a “whim” that ought to be ignored or a con-
sidered judgment? Critics typically use phrases like “pander-
ing” to refer to representatives who represent views the critics
disliked; for views with which they agree, phrases like “repre-
sentative democracy” or even “the wisdom of the crowd” are
more likely to be used.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
No one, of course, argues that judges ought to do nothing
but look to the preferences of their constituents when making
27. Indeed, by some accounts, the science that undergirded Roe v.
Wade (e.g., regarding viability) is no longer accepted, so the fac-
tual basis of Roe may well have been very seriously undermined.
See Chelsea Conaboy, The Abortion Debate Doesn’t Change, But the
Science of Abortion Does, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 31, 2018)
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/08/31/the-abortion-
debate-doesn-change-but-science-abortion-does/smHRPvw5XDk-
TXzMUrADawK/story.html.
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The voter recall of California judge Aaron Persky in June2018 was a watershed cultural moment. For the first timein more than forty years, a sitting judge had been removed
from the bench, by the local citizenry, in a special election. The
recall—instigated in reaction to Judge Persky’s lenient sentence
for a defendant convicted of three counts of sexual assault—was
hailed as a major political victory for the #MeToo movement,
and a sign of an emerging consensus that soft treatment of sex
offenders within the justice system is no longer acceptable.
Any questions about the sustainability of the moment were
answered five months later, when Alaska voters removed
another experienced trial judge, Michael Corey, on similar
grounds. Like Judge Persky, Judge Corey drew national atten-
tion after granting a light sentence to a sexual offender. As was
true with Judge Persky, the sentence stirred widespread dismay
and local protest. And as they had with Judge Persky, political
activists rapidly organized to remove Judge Corey from the
bench, arguing that his actions constituted a dereliction of
judicial duty. The campaigns in California and Alaska
employed similar messaging and similar methods of outreach.
And both campaigns saw the judge’s removal as merely the first
step of a larger political movement to change existing law and
social attitudes about sexual assault. 
Given their outward resemblance, it is tempting to view the
ousters of Judge Persky and Judge Corey as the shared—even
inevitable—product of a particular cultural and political era.
But in one important respect, the two events were fundamen-
tally different. Judge Persky faced a recall election, a process
that is both rare and difficult to implement, and which is specif-
ically designed as an outlet for voters to protest particular judi-
cial decisions. By contrast, Judge Corey faced a retention elec-
tion, an occurrence that is both automatic and routine, and
which is designed to allow voters to assess the judge’s overall
performance without regard to specific decisions. Recall elec-
tions and retention elections have different purposes, different
histories, and, typically, different outcomes. That a recall effort
and a retention bid could produce such similar campaigns, with
such similar results, is therefore noteworthy.
The crossover nature of the anti-Corey campaign also mer-
its close attention. Recall campaigns are premised on popular
accountability, and are intended in part to channel voter out-
rage over particular judicial decisions or comments. Retention
elections, by contrast, embrace a vision of professional
accountability, a broader view that focuses on a judge’s skill,
competence, and demeanor. Until 2018, the tone and tactics of
recall elections had never worked in a retention setting. But the
campaign against Judge Corey bucked this trend, successfully
turning a retention election into a referendum on a single judi-
cial decision. It is a worrisome development. 
JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE PURSUIT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
This article examines the contrasting visions of judicial
accountability in recall and retention elections, with particular
application to the anti-Corey campaign. Judicial accountability
is a core component of judicial legitimacy, which itself is a
reflection of the public’s faith in the courts’ institutional com-
petence. Judicial legitimacy flows from the belief that judges
will interpret and apply the law in a generally trustworthy
manner consistent with their constitutional obligations.1 Legit-
imacy is the lifeblood of the courts: without it, they cannot
obtain public support for their rulings,2 or even the material
resources they need to operate.3
The methods by which judges are selected or removed
occupy a central role in establishing the courts’ legitimacy. This
is true because—unlike private organizations that can hire the
candidates most suited to their needs and goals—courts lack
the power to choose their own members. It is therefore imper-
ative upon those who do select judges to provide the courts
with jurists who are capable and willing to rule fairly, honestly,
and thoughtfully. Judges must be sufficiently independent that
their decisions are not unduly influenced by political or social
pressure, and sufficiently accountable that their decisions are
grounded in established legal principles and practices. The his-
tory of judicial selection in the United States reflects an ongo-
ing conversation about how best to accomplish that balance.
From the earliest days of the Republic, it was understood
that protecting the legitimacy of the courts meant adequately
distancing judges from the patronage of individual political
actors. Accordingly, eight of the thirteen original states vested
judicial appointment power in the state legislature, and the
remaining five required an independent council to advise on or
approve the governor’s judicial choices.4 Save a couple of local
experiments, legislative or council-based gubernatorial
appointment remained the dominant form of state judicial
selection for the next seventy-five years. 
In the 1840s, however, a series of financial panics triggered
by overspending state governments seriously eroded citizen
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trust in their legislatures.5 The episode raised questions not
only about the institutional competence of state representa-
tives, but also of the judges they appointed. Reformers argued
that if judges who owed their office to legislators were not
independent enough to prevent legislative malfeasance, a dif-
ferent method of selecting judges was needed. The agreed-
upon solution was direct elections, reflecting the belief that
judges who were directly chosen by the people could protect
against corruption or incompetence in the other branches.
New York adopted direct elections in 1846, and many other
states quickly followed suit. By 1861, the majority of states
(twenty-four in all) had changed their constitutions to provide
for selection of judges by popular vote. 6
Direct elections resolved public concerns about undue judi-
cial fealty to legislatures, but over time elections themselves
came under fire. For one thing, candidates running for judicial
office had to align themselves with a political party, which
seemed at odds with the impartial administration of justice. Of
even greater concern, judges in many cities eventually became
enmeshed in machine politics.7 Democratic party boss Tom
Pendergast, for example, notoriously controlled all judicial
bids in Kansas City for decades, rewarding judges who ruled in
his favor and seeking a swift end to the careers of those who
dared to rule against him.8
Such blatant exercises of political control inspired another
modification—nonpartisan elections—which permitted judi-
cial candidates to appear on the ballot without a party desig-
nation. This selection method removed some of the overtly
political tones from contested judicial elections, but still left
open the question of whether a judge so accountable to a sin-
gle group of voters (or party bosses) could truly be seen as
impartial.9 As the twentieth century dawned, the public com-
mitment to the courts’ institutional legitimacy endured, but
the optimal method of balancing judicial accountability and
judicial independence remained elusive.
RETENTION ELECTIONS AND THE SHIFT TO 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
In 1914, Northwestern University law professor Albert
Kales proposed a new type of selection method known as merit
selection. The proposal eliminated contested elections alto-
gether and replaced them with a system that allocated the
responsibility of judicial selection among a number of different
actors.10 Specifically, it called for a nonpartisan nominating
commission to present a slate of qualified judicial candidates
to the governor, who would then appoint one of the nominees
to an open seat. Each appointed judge would subsequently face
periodic retention elections, in which the judge would run
unopposed, the only question
facing voters being whether the
judge should be retained on the
bench. The proposal was quickly
embraced by the American Judi-
cature Society, and later by the
American Bar Association.
Merit selection was designed
in part to improve public percep-
tions of the courts’ institutional
competence, by embracing pro-
fessional accountability and
expertise as core principles of the judicial role. This was no
accident. In the early twentieth century, lawyers themselves
were undergoing a professional revolution, highlighted by the
emergence of graduate legal instruction and an organized bar,
and the same technocratic ideals were being carried over to the
judiciary.11 Merit selection accordingly utilized a similarly
technocratic mechanism for choosing judges. It relied on a
commission of knowledgeable experts, assuring (at least in
theory) that only the most qualified and capable judges would
be selected. It sought to hold newly appointed judges account-
able for their efficiency and workmanship, rather than specific
case outcomes. And if an unqualified or nakedly partisan judge
somehow slipped through the initial selection process, reten-
tion elections guaranteed that voters could remove the offend-
ing judge on their own.
Retention elections were arguably the foremost innovation
of the Kales proposal, designed to avoid the characteristics of
contested judicial elections—fundraising, advertising, public
policy pronouncements, interest group meetings, and currying
favor with party bosses—that most clearly undermined the
courts’ institutional legitimacy. Running unopposed and solely
on his or her own record, a judge could sidestep these political
landmines. But retention elections presented another problem:
most voters did not know enough about their judges to make
meaningful decisions about whether they should be retained.
As a consequence, some voters chose not to cast retention bal-
lots at all, while others relied on low-quality proxy information
about the judge—such as the judge’s surname or perceived
gender or ethnicity—to inform their decisions.12
One solution to this knowledge gap was to provide voters
with information regarding each judge’s professional skills and
demeanor, either informally through polls of local bar associa-
tions or formally through state-run judicial performance evalua-
tion (JPE) programs. The first JPE program began in Alaska in
1975, and similar programs had spread to nineteen states by the
mid-2000s. In its most robust form, JPE evaluates individual
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judges on five criteria directly
related to the process of adjudica-
tion, using a variety of informa-
tional sources.13 The outcomes of
particular cases are never consid-
ered as part of the evaluation. Inde-
pendent, nonpartisan commissions
then decide whether each evaluated
judge meets a set of predetermined
performance standards, and trans-
mit that information to voters
through voter guides, websites, and
(increasingly) social media. By
focusing on the qualities that make
a judge a good professional, JPE
programs aim to improve both judi-
cial accountability (by presenting
meaningful information to voters about a sitting judge’s perfor-
mance) and judicial independence (by educating voters about
the content-neutral qualities they should expect in a judge).
Indeed, the capacity of JPE programs to emphasize and contex-
tualize judicial professionalism has led to their adoption not just
in merit-selection states, but also in states with appointment sys-
tems and contested judicial elections.
Today, a mosaic of judicial selection methods is in use across
the country, encompassing gubernatorial and legislative
appointment, partisan and nonpartisan elections, and merit
selection, in addition to local variants. Regardless of their pre-
ferred methods, however, states continue to emphasize the
importance of their courts’ institutional legitimacy, and most
states have embraced judicial professionalism as a key contrib-
utor to that goal.
RECALL ELECTIONS AS A FORM OF POPULAR
ACCOUNTABILITY
Retention elections came out of a longstanding national dia-
logue about the best way to construct a legitimate judiciary. Not
so for recall elections, which from their inception were seen as
a narrower housecleaning measure. The impetus for recall was
a political battle between judges and social reformers during the
first two decades of the twentieth century. During that period,
the Supreme Court invalidated several notable pieces of eco-
nomic and social legislation, drawing the wrath of populists
and Progressives. Theodore Roosevelt and William Jennings
Bryan, among others, characterized the judges responsible for
these decisions as unaccountable actors who bent the law to
suit their own economic and social philosophies, and argued
that such decisions would undermine the broader legitimacy of
the judiciary. These concerns nourished an ultra-reform move-
ment at both the state and federal level, which sought to give
the public much greater control over judges and their decisions. 
A key plank in the ultra-reform platform was the recall elec-
tion, a tool that would allow voters to remove judges who were
perceived as not properly discharging their responsibilities. As
one proponent explained, recall elections were a way to surgi-
cally excise unaccountable judges from an otherwise trustwor-
thy judicial branch.14 In 1903, California became the first state
to allow the popular recall of judges, and several other states
quickly followed suit.15 At the state and federal level, Progres-
sives also suggested allowing voters to recall (that is, override)
specific judicial decisions.16
Because judicial recall is such a blunt and potent tool for pub-
lic management of the judiciary, states adopting the procedure
intentionally made it difficult to implement. In California, for
example, merely placing a recall of a superior court judge on the
ballot requires proponents to prepare, file, and publish a notice
of intention; prepare and receive approval of the recall petition;
collect valid signatures equal to at least 20 percent of the last
vote for the office; and file the petition before a designated statu-
tory deadline.17 The vast majority of recall efforts stumble over
these early hurdles and die out well before Election Day.18
Even with these procedural protections in place to prevent
abuse, judicial recall was not universally supported. Indeed,
prominent conservatives of the Progressive Era—among them
William Howard Taft and Roscoe Pound—were horrified by
the idea. They argued instead that any sort of election involv-
ing judges “enmeshed the judiciary in politics, undermined
respect for the courts, and discouraged the selection of highly
qualified jurists.”19 Recall elections also clashed with the
developing notions of judicial professionalism, which Taft held
dear and which he routinely touted during and after his presi-
dency. In a moment of high drama in 1911, then-President Taft
vetoed a joint congressional resolution that would have admit-
ted Arizona to the Union, specifically because the proposed
state constitution provided for judicial recall.20 Still, recall
remained in the public discourse, and many states—seeing no
philosophical inconsistency between recall and retention—
eventually adopted both practices.
THE DIVERGENT PATHS OF RECALL AND RETENTION
ELECTIONS
Recall and retention elections differ not only in their goals,
but also in the way they have been used over time. Recall elec-
tions represent a rare and particularly combustible form of
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judicial accountability. Before the Persky vote last June, there
had not been a successful recall of a state judge since 1977,
when Wisconsin judge Archie Simonson was removed from
the bench in reaction to his controversial statements about the
community’s “sexually permissive environment” during the
sentencing of a teenage boy convicted of rape.21 In both the
Persky and Simonson episodes, popular outrage over a specific
incident fueled the recall movement.
None of this has been characteristic of retention elections,
which occur on a set schedule in merit selection states, and
which emphasize professional, as opposed to popular, account-
ability for judges. With the inclusion of JPE programs in many
states, retention elections are increasingly framed as an exercise
in citizen-initiated professional review. Voters are asked to con-
sider the judge’s demonstrated administrative ability, communi-
cation skills, legal knowledge, impartiality, and courtroom
demeanor—all aspects of professionalism and all divorced from
assessment of particular decisions or case outcomes. As a result,
most retention elections have evolved into relatively quiet and
apolitical affairs. To be sure, there have been periodic efforts to
not retain judges in reaction to specific case outcomes, mostly
originating from the right side of the political spectrum. But
perhaps because citizens in merit-selection states have been
conditioned to expect their judges to be impartial, professional,
and fair, these single-issue campaigns are rarely successful.
Indeed, even when judges decide controversial issues shortly
before an election, voters typically choose to retain them on the
basis of their overall professionalism and body of work.22
Campaigns against the retention of specific judges have
found success on rare occasions, but never by making the elec-
tion a referendum on a particular case outcome. Instead, these
campaigns have asserted more broadly that the targeted judges
lacked professionalism and institutional humility. In 1986, for
example, three California supreme court justices lost their bids
for retention after an extensive campaign aimed at their deci-
sions to overturn death sentences in several criminal cases.23
Although the motivation for the campaign was a substantive
disagreement over the acceptability of capital punishment, the
message to the voters—at least in part—was something more
fundamental: the targeted judges had overstepped their insti-
tutional role, substituted their judgment for that of the people,
and compromised the legitimacy of the judiciary itself.24 In
three other instances in which state supreme court justices
were not retained—in Nebraska and Tennessee in 1996,25 and
in Iowa in 201026—the anti-retention campaigns employed the
same strategy, framing the tar-
geted judges’ decisions not as a
mere policy preference, but rather
as an egregious example of pro-
fessional dereliction and institu-
tional overreach.27
The success of these particular
anti-retention campaigns illus-
trates how deeply engrained
impartiality and humility are in
citizen expectations of the judge’s
professional role. The campaign
organizers recognized that voters
expected their judges to respect
the legislative process, the separa-
tion of powers, and the rule of
law more generally. Accordingly, these anti-retention cam-
paigns deliberately focused on the limited role of the courts in
the larger structure of American government, allowing them to
further suggest that the targeted judges had made policy
choices that were properly left to the legislature or to the peo-
ple themselves.28
It bears emphasis that even this theme of institutional over-
reach rarely produces the desired results for anti-retention
forces. Most judges who face retention cannot be easily carica-
tured as overstepping their bounds or acting outside of their
responsibilities. Most professionally sound judges are retained.
And the handful of judges who lack professional demeanor or
competence are usually not returned on those grounds alone. 
Judicial retention elections across the country in 2018 were
largely consistent with these historical trends. Most judges seek-
ing to continue their service were comfortably retained; those
who were not retained typically had received poor performance
evaluations. But 2018 also witnessed the emergence of a new
kind of anti-retention campaign, built on the model of Persky
recall, which was seen most clearly in the efforts to remove
Judge Michael Corey from his seat on the Alaska Superior Court. 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST JUDGE
COREY
Judge Corey was first appointed to the bench in 2014, and
faced a retention election at the end of his four-year term. In
August 2018, Corey received a strong performance evaluation
from the Alaska Judicial Council, which unanimously recom-
mended that voters retain him.29 But with only weeks before
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the election, a seemingly quiet
retention bid would become
much more explosive.
In mid-September, Judge
Corey was asked to approve a
plea agreement in a criminal case
involving stomach-churning
facts. The defendant was alleged
to have offered a ride to the vic-
tim, which she accepted. He
drove her to a dead-end street,
where he asked her to get out of
the car, tackled her, and strangled
her until she lost consciousness. He then ejaculated onto her
body and waited until she regained consciousness before dri-
ving away. The defendant was initially charged with first-
degree kidnapping, two counts of assault, and misdemeanor
harassment for contacting the victim with a bodily fluid. How-
ever, prosecutors dropped the kidnapping charge after con-
cluding that they would not be able to meet their burden of
proof at trial. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to the
greater assault charge, which, given his otherwise clean crimi-
nal history, carried a sentence of zero to two years in jail. The
state and the defendant eventually reached a plea deal calling
for a two-year sentence with one year suspended, and three
years probation. The defendant also would receive credit for
time served while wearing an ankle monitor. Significantly, this
meant that he would face no additional jail time.
At the plea hearing, Judge Corey probed the prosecution
about the adequacy of the proposed plea deal.30 Of particular
concern was that the crime was plainly sexual in nature, yet
the defendant had not been charged with sexual assault and
was not even required to register as a sex offender. The prose-
cutor explained that the defendant’s actions, while appalling,
did not qualify as a sex crime under Alaska law. The prosecu-
tor also noted that the state had insisted on probation as a way
to require the defendant to undergo sex-offender treatment.31
Judge Corey described the case as “breathtaking,”32 and
commented that the proposed sentence “at first blush would
really quite frankly strike me as way too light.”33 Nevertheless,
he felt constrained by several aspects of Alaska law in deter-
mining whether to accept the agreement. Among other things,
he could not consider the charges that had been dropped by
the prosecution, nor could he propose a sentence aggravator
on his own.34 After a 30-minute hearing, Judge Corey accepted
the plea agreement, based heavily on the defendant’s prospects
for rehabilitation, as well as the judge’s stated belief that the
attorneys in the case knew “far better and more about the case
than I do presently. They know more about what can be proven
and what can’t.”35
The decision to accept the plea deal made national news
almost immediately, and quickly gave rise to a local movement
calling itself No More Free Passes. The movement was ani-
mated by two central concerns: the perceived unjustness of the
sentence, and the failure of Judge Corey to discuss the victim
during the plea hearing. No More Free Passes accordingly
identified two corresponding goals: to change the existing law,
and to remove the judge who had approved the plea. 
From the start, the approach taken by No More Free Passes
differed significantly from the handful of previous successful
anti-retention efforts with respect to source, platform, tone,
and underlying assumptions about the proper role of the judi-
ciary. Indeed, its tone and tactics most closely mirrored the
Persky recall campaign months before. Three characteristics of
the campaigns were particularly notable.
First, the push to remove the judge was organized and for-
tified primarily by those on the left side of the political spec-
trum, drawing their energy from the #MeToo movement and
the contemporaneous and controversial confirmation hearings
for Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh.36 This was new.
Historically, aggressive anti-retention campaigns have been ini-
tiated by conservative groups opposed to judicial decisions
concerning capital punishment, abortion, same-sex marriage,
and the state’s taxing power. This development suggests that
retention elections may now become an instrument for mobi-
lization by partisans on both sides of the political spectrum.
Second, social media played a key role in spreading the anti-
retention message. No More Free Passes created a Facebook
page just three days after Judge Corey approved the plea deal,
and immediately began advocating for the judge’s ouster. By
November, the page had approximately 4,000 followers, and
No More Free Passes was updating the page at least daily, elic-
iting thousands of viewer reactions in the process. No More
Free Passes also created a GoFundMe page to solicit donations,
and an Instagram page to spread its message. One of the
group’s founders, Elizabeth Williams, also promoted the cause
on her personal Instagram page with hashtags like #nomore-
freepasses and #nooncorey. And while No More Free Passes did
not take to Twitter directly, the campaign benefited from
dozens of sympathetic tweets by other users in the weeks lead-
ing up the election. To be sure, the anti-Corey campaign also
used traditional media effectively, granting interviews and
writing op-eds for local newspapers and broadcasters. But
social media played a central role in getting the message out.
Finally, the anti-Corey campaign broke most significantly
from previous anti-retention efforts in the way it presented the
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role of the judge. Previously, anti-retention campaigns had
sought to convince voters that the targeted judges had acted
unprofessionally by venturing beyond the limits of their
authority. The fundamental message of the anti-Corey cam-
paign, however, was that the judge had not done enough with
his authority in the face of a potentially unjust outcome. In an
op-ed published the week before the election, the founders of
No More Free Passes wrote, “Judges hold one of the most pow-
erful positions in modern society because we expect them to
exercise judicial discretion.”37 This message represented a
complete reversal from the themes of earlier anti-retention
campaigns, which accused targeted judges of insufficient
humility in exercising their judicial roles. 
The anti-Corey campaign was also able to neutralize the
issue of professional competence which typically influences
retention voting. Just weeks before accepting the plea deal,
Judge Corey had been unanimously recommended for reten-
tion by the Alaska Judicial Council on the basis of his strong
performance evaluation. A good performance review helps to
place isolated controversial decisions in context, and histori-
cally voters have been unwilling to remove a good judge based
on a single case. Despite public reminders about his perfor-
mance evaluation and op-eds from members of the bar urging
voters to place the single decision in broader context, this time
voters were unmoved. It represented the first time in Alaska’s
history that a judge was not retained after receiving a positive
evaluation and recommendation.
In light of the unusual tenor and tactics of the campaign,
there is good reason to view Judge Corey’s non-retention as an
anomaly. Indeed, every other attempt to target judges for specific
decisions (as opposed to poor job performance) during the 2018
election cycle was unsuccessful. Consistent with the history of
retention elections, these anti-retention campaigns only spoke
to a limited portion of the voting population, and (where avail-
able) judicial performance evaluations seemed to serve as a bul-
wark against knee-jerk decisions to remove judges. The fact that
the anti-Corey campaign bucked these trends is therefore note-
worthy. Moreover, the particular facts of the case underlying
Judge Corey’s decision were broadly similar to the facts underly-
ing Judge Persky’s decision, the campaign strategies closely mir-
rored those of the anti-Persky campaign, and the proponents of
the Persky recall offered enthusiastic public support to the anti-
Corey campaign. Given these facts, the non-retention of Judge
Corey is probably best understood as part of a larger popular
backlash situated in a specific cultural moment.38
At the same time, there is rea-
son to see the anti-Corey cam-
paign as something more than an
isolated event, and to believe that
the messaging and mobilization
tactics borrowed from judicial
recalls will become more promi-
nent in future retention elections.
Another anti-retention campaign
from the fall of 2018—this time
to unseat California Supreme
Court Justice Carol Corrigan—
illustrates the concern. Justice
Corrigan was appointed to the
court in 2005 and retained in
2006, entitling her to a subse-
quent twelve-year term. During that time, Justice Corrigan
authored hundreds of opinions on a wide variety of issues, and
was generally well-regarded as a jurist. As the 2018 election
neared, prominent newspapers endorsed her retention. But
activists launched a powerful campaign to remove her, based
entirely on an opinion she had written ten years earlier.  
In May 2008, Justice Corrigan dissented in part from Cali-
fornia’s landmark opinion legalizing same-sex marriage. In the
dissent, she explained that she personally supported same-sex
marriage rights, but believed that the issue was one for the vot-
ers, not the courts, to decide.39 After the state’s voters reen-
acted the state’s ban on same-sex marriage through Proposition
8 in November 2008, she (along with five other justices)
upheld the election result. 
Proposition 8 was eventually struck down in federal court,40
but Justice Corrigan’s dissent in the original same-sex marriage
case was not forgotten. Like the campaign against Judge Corey,
the campaign against Justice Corrigan eschewed charges of
unprofessionalism or institutional overreach, focusing instead
on the single substantive message that the justice had “voted
twice against marriage equality.” An anonymously authored
Facebook page titled “Vote NO on Carol Corrigan—CA
Supreme Court Justice Against Equality” posted at least eigh-
teen sharable photos and videos urging Californians to vote
against retention. On Twitter, the anti-Corrigan campaign was
bolstered by tweets from prominent celebrities as well as ordi-
nary citizens.41 Many social media posts had both a multiplier
and a boomerang effect, originating in California before being
picked up by friends and sympathizers around the country
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(and the world), who in turn urged their associates back in the
justice’s home state to cast a vote against her. As with Judge
Corey, an essentially local election took on national (and inter-
national) dimensions. 
In the end, the campaign against Justice Corrigan was
unsuccessful, and she was retained for another term. But the
ten-year gestation period of the anti-Corrigan campaign sug-
gests that in at least some circumstances, anti-retention activists
are willing to take the long view. In addition, the shared tactics
of the anti-Corey, anti-Corrigan, and anti-Persky campaigns
suggests that in at least some instances, the passions and sub-
stantive messages that more typically animate judicial recall
elections can bleed into regularly scheduled retention elections.
For supporters of a professional and depoliticized judiciary,
the introduction into retention elections of tactics and themes
normally reserved for recall elections is a deeply disconcerting
development. Recall elections are a powerful form of popular
accountability, meant to be used only in the most egregious cir-
cumstances, and are by design difficult to initiate. Retention
elections, by contrast, are designed with a different purpose in
mind, and do not feature these important procedural safe-
guards. Judges appear automatically on the retention ballot,
allowing a last-minute campaign against them to arise with no
warning. As the anti-Corey campaign demonstrates, a passion-
ate electorate can transform a standard retention bid into a de
facto recall election in a matter of weeks.
Recall and retention can coexist, as long as each mechanism
stays true to its intended purpose. But retention elections
should not transform into regularly-scheduled recall elections
by default. Using regular checks of professional accountability
as an opportunity to impose outcome-based accountability
would threaten the decisional independence of individual
judges, and dramatically undermine the judiciary’s overall
legitimacy and institutional competence. 
“MOVING FORWARD” 
The day after Judge Corey lost his retention bid, the leader
of No More Free Passes posted the following message on the
group’s Facebook page: “Moving forward, we will no longer be
discussing Mr. Corey. I believe his family and friends when
they tell me he is a great man, husband, and father. He deserves
privacy and peace during this time. We wish him nothing but
the best in his future.” That sentiment may be cold comfort for
the judge. It should be a wake-up call for all who continue to
desire a judiciary that is professional, fair, and independent.
One must proceed cautiously in attempting to draw broad
conclusions from limited data points. But the events of 2018
do suggest the ongoing need to focus voters on the importance
of a professional and institutionally legitimate judiciary. This
means emphasizing that judges must be accountable to their
professional and institutional obligations, as well as the limits
on judicial discretion that those obligations impose. More
specifically, citizens should be reminded that judges are not at
liberty simply to change or ignore laws with which they dis-
agree. Rather, consistent with their authority and professional
responsibilities, they must do their best to apply valid laws to
the cases before them. 
This is not to suggest that voters will—or even should—
take a neutral view on the outcomes of specific cases. The deci-
sions that animated the campaigns against Judge Persky, Judge
Corey, and Justice Corrigan were quite fairly the subject of
public debate and private anguish. But those campaigns also
arose out of a mistaken belief that judges have the unfettered
authority simply to do “the right thing,” as opposed to labor-
ing within their constitutional and institutional limitations.
Members of the public should understand that the quality of
the judiciary must be determined not by reference to a specific
case, but rather by asking whether judges reach their decisions
in a fair, accurate, and trustworthy manner.
Emphasizing judicial professionalism has a long and suc-
cessful track record of helping to depoliticize judicial selection,
but the message must be updated for the 2020s and beyond. In
the twentieth century, judicial professionalism was equated
with expertise, and the special training and skill that the legal
profession required. The message worked because of the tradi-
tionally high regard given to experts in a given field. But the
current era has seen an increase in public skepticism over
expertise, with many Americans regarding “experts” as noth-
ing more than an undifferentiated mass of wealthy elites.42
Consequently, it may no longer be enough to say that a judge
should be retained because of her training, experience, and
knowledge; it is also necessary to stress the judiciary’s com-
mitment to more modern notions of professionalism, such as
transparency and continuous improvement. Courts themselves
can take a role in this messaging, by routinely sharing the con-
crete steps they are taking to meet the needs of their users and
the general public. 
Courts can also be proactive about reaching out to other
organizations to help spread the message of judicial profes-
sionalism. The organized bar has long been a loyal advocate for
the judiciary, based on its intimate knowledge of the courts and
respect for the rule of law. It is a logical place to start. But
lawyers today are facing the same anti-elite backlash as judges.
Courts may also need to develop connections with less tradi-
tional allies—including perhaps state legislators or community
organizations—to reiterate the importance of judicial profes-
sionalism and institutional legitimacy. An ounce of prevention
today will be worth it, lest the substantive moral certainty of
recall elections become the prevailing lens through which all
future judicial decisions are assessed.
Jordan M. Singer is a Professor of Law at New
England Law | Boston, where he teaches courses
on civil litigation, judicial process, and intellec-
tual property. His blog, The Interdependent
Third Branch (www.interdependentcourts.com),
tracks developments in court organization,
administration, structure, and strategy, with an
emphasis on how courts interact with their
external environments.
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Across
1 No great shakes
5 ___ court advantage
9 Biblical father of twins
14 URL starter
15 Poet Khayyám
16 Electric car company
17 To be, to Paris
18 Stipulation at the bar?
20 Uses as a prop
22 ___-skelter
23 ___ Bandito (old ad toon)
24 Board leader?
26 Captured
27 Obi-___ Kenobi
28 Letter-shaped hardware
32 It’s a pain!
34 “Make love, ___!”
36 “Jazz Masters” org.
37 Auction section
38 Speculation at the bar, after
“one”?
39 Dynamite letters
40 Aussie runner
41 Mysterious Queen?
42 Inverse ohms
43 Egyptian Christians
45 “___ it on me”
46 Dundee turndown
47 ___ chloride
49 Scott of “Men in Trees”
52 Plaster work
55 Uranium 238, e.g.
57 Stipulation at the bar?
BAR CALLS by Judge Victor Fleming
54 Home of the Jazz
55 “Makes sense!”
56 Movie rating symbol
58 ___-Mart
59 Fury
60 O.T. book
61 Diarist Nin
62 Vicinity
63 “Saturday Night Live” bit
64 Little laugh
65 Lustful look
66 “¿33-Down ___ usted?”
Down
1 Bookcase part
2 Fur source
3 Stipulation at the bar?
4 Like sandals
5 Itinerant traveler
6 Foreboding phenomenon
7 West of “My Little Chickadee”
8 Miscalculate
9 Mickey Spillane novel
10 Aquanaut’s base
11 Helper (abbr.)
12 On the calm side
13 Singer Vikki
19 Existential life force
21 Toper
24 Breakfast fare
25 Not careful
27 Like a mammoth
29 Stipulation at the bar?
30 “Jaywalking” celeb
31 Body decorations, slangily
32 Guinness of “Star Wars”
33 “¿___ 66-Across usted?”
34 ___ pros (dismiss without preju-
dice, casually)
35 In ___ event
38 Precedent establisher
42 “The ___ Falcon”
44 Electronics whiz
46 Classical start?
48 Like Szechuan food
50 Footnote abbr.
51 Triangular Greek letter
52 Sultan of ___ (Babe Ruth)
53 Pitchfork’s piercer
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 47.
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For nearly all of us, To Kill a Mockingird served as one of themajor milestones on our paths to heeding the call to servethe rule of law. For me, Harper Lee’s iconic novel shaped
my journey from a slightly different perspective. Legal profes-
sionals routinely praise the inspirational bravery and integrity
of the central character, lawyer Atticus Finch. But two other
pieces of the story were more formative for me.
When prompted, most can remember that tension-filled
scene in which unarmed Atticus Finch tried to face down a
mob intent on lynching his client, Tom Robinson, an African-
American accused of raping a white woman in racist America.
Atticus doesn’t make much progress until his daughter, Scout,
and two other children show up. Scout greets members of the
mob by name, takes away their anonymity within the mob, and
shames them with her innocence. The mob mentality is broken
not by force, authority, or persuasion as in the classic Holly-
wood western but by individual humanity. Everybody lives to
witness Atticus’s brilliant and spirited defense of Mr. Robinson
in court. 
I find that far too many people forget the second piece of the
story that so impacted me. Despite Atticus’s utterly convincing
defense, Mr. Robinson was found guilty in a clear miscarriage
of justice. Given the time, Tom Robinson was, in all likelihood,
executed a short time later. And so I was always left to wonder,
what was the point of it all? It seemed to me that the commu-
nity just made a lynching look like a legitimate legal proceed-
ing.
Part of the reason I had a jaded view of the novel was that it
was an all too familiar story when I first read it. The journey
taken by Atticus and Tom Robinson struck a little too close to
home for me. I had grown up visiting extended family in rural
Mississippi and hearing the stories of their lives around dinner
tables and on front porches. Slowly over time, I learned that
my grandfather had found himself in a situation similar to that
of Atticus Finch. But grandfather Prince’s experience was a lit-
tle different.
It was really just a scrap of a story at first. In different
houses, I heard different pieces of it from different perspec-
tives, sometimes not even realizing they were talking about the
same event. I only heard my grandfather Prince talk about his
role once, literally on his death bed. I spent the next twenty
years asking questions, reading, and researching in archives.
Through a mix of family legend and recorded fact, here is what
I’ve learned. 
In a land famous for its heat, that summer had been a record
breaker and among the driest on record. Union County, Mis-
sissippi was mostly subsistence farms then, many of them
sharecroppers. With failure of the crops looming due to the dry
heat, people were on edge.
Friday morning Amanda Gaines found her 21-year-old
daughter, Bessie, crawling out of the pea patch near their
home. Bessie was bruised and bloodied. Through the swollen
pulp that had been her face, she was able to tell her mother
that she’d been attacked down by the well. She’d also been
raped. She’d been beaten so badly you have to wonder if she’d
been left for dead.
They sent for a neighbor that had a car, still relatively rare
in these parts. They took Bessie to the nearest town, New
Albany. New Albany was also the county seat. They took her
straight to Dr. Maes’s hospital.
Sheriff Johnny Roberts got the story as best he could from
the Gaines family. He assembled a posse and headed to that
well. They had tracking hounds that soon found a scent and
they were off in pursuit.
That was wooded bottom land, rich in hard woods. Soon
enough, the hounds led the posse across the path of a crew of
hired men that were felling trees for an itinerate saw mill.
There were four men in that crew and suspicion quickly fell on
one of them, L.Q. Ivy.
History does not tell us why suspicion fell on L.Q. Maybe
he was the youngest. He was just a couple of weeks shy of his
18th birthday. He had been born and raised within a mile or
two of that very spot. Maybe he had some attitude or maybe
somebody had a grudge against him. Given the time and place,
they could have chosen any one of the crew or all of them.
They were all African-American, the year was 1925, Bessie was
white, and this was an era of frequent mob rule. 
In that time, lynchings were all too common in nearly every
state in the union. But this had happened in Mississippi, a state
in a brutal era that stood head and shoulders above the rest in
lynchings with 500 or more documented victims. 
But this was also Union County, and Union County seemed
to be different from its neighbors. Nearby counties numbered
their lynchings by the dozen, but Union County had never had
a lynching. Sheriff Roberts and his deputies aimed to keep it
that way. At 25 years old, my grandfather was a newly minted
deputy for Sheriff Roberts, only a few weeks on the job.
Despite the lack of lynchings in Union County, Sheriff
Roberts knew the dangers. Right from the beginning and
unlike the sheriff in To Kill a Mockingbird, he started a series of
strategies to see his prisoner live for a courtroom trial. He took
his first precaution as soon as he arrested L.Q. He did not take
him to the medieval looking stone jail behind the Union
County courthouse. Instead, he secretly took L.Q. out of town
to the community of Aberdeen where he could hide him. 
This happened in the fall. The farmers had their crops “laid
by,” which meant they had time on their hands while they
waited and sweated for the harvest. News of Bessie’s violation
and L.Q.’s arrest spread fast on otherwise idle tongues. 
Bessie Gaines was said to be clinging to life in the hospital.
Dr. Maes’s hospital stood just a few blocks from courthouse
square. The square had a classic American layout with wide
The Fiction of Atticus Finch Meets
the Reality of James Prince
David Prince
C E S S AY
44 Court Review - Volume 55 
Author’s Note:
This essay shares a combination of family lore and historical facts.
Where family storytelling is at odds with accuracy, I have chosen the ver-
sion I was told in countless homes growing up.  This essay should not be
confused with an attempt to set down a dispositive history.  For the best
recitation of the true facts, see the reporting done by journalist Lareeca
Rucker at https://bit.ly/2wPOFG and drawn partially from the contempo-
rary account of Memphis reporter J.L. Roulhac. 
Footnotes
1. Billy Preston is a fictional name and represents a composite of sev-
eral people.
grass lawns almost all the way around the turn-of-the-century
building that housed all government offices and the courtoom
for the circuit-riding judge. A crowd gathered that Friday night
on the courthouse lawn. They say it reached over 4,000 people
even though the town was home to well under 2,000 souls.
The crowd was in an ugly mood and already could justly be
called a mob.
The community’s official leadership were huddled in the
courthouse trying to decide how to diffuse the situation.
Unlike with Atticus Finch, the local officials hadn’t left town
and also wanted to avoid a lynching. But, also unlike Atticus’s
mob, this one wasn’t just a handful of people but was thou-
sands. 
The officials made much the same decision as Atticus did
and tried to reason with the mob. But Sheriff Roberts also had
his deputies circulating in the crowd disarming people. The
deputies are said to have gathered wheelbarrow loads of
weapons. 
Judge Pegram came out of the courthouse first to talk to the
crowd. He promised the crowd swift justice. The crowd
shouted back that they could be swifter. 
Mayor Tate tried next. He told the crowd to let the authori-
ties handle it and to go home. They booed him down.
Then came New Albany’s favorite son, U.S. Senator Hubert
Stephens. Beloved Sen. Stephens told the “good people” to go
back to their farms and their families. They shouted back that
he should go home himself. They told Sen. Stephens that if
they wanted his advice, they’d ask for it.
The talkers had not made much headway but they had
bought time for those disarming deputies. This was in an era
before amplification, and the talkers were accomplished cam-
paign shouters that could make themselves heard by outdoor
crowds of thousands like this. So it took many by surprise
when Sheriff Roberts stood before them and appeared to say
something. He had the kind of booming command voice that
a sheriff should have, but nobody seemed to be able to quite
hear him. But he had caught their interest. A silence settled
over the crowd as they strained to hear what Sheriff Roberts
had to say. 
Unlike the flowery language of the politicians who had
already spoken, Sheriff Roberts was simple and plainspoken.
He did not try to persuade them, he just gave them hard facts.
Once he had their attention, the command returned to his
voice. He told them, “He ain’t here. He’s in jail down the river.
Nothing for you to do now, so go on home. He ain’t here.”
The crowd grumbled and stomped but, with their quarry
out of reach, they slowly began to break up.
To Kill a Mockingbird would have us believe that this was the
end of the ugly side of the mob, but real life is not so clean.
Some in the crowd did not give
up so easily. Billy Preston1 and
several of his boys paid a late-
night visit to Judge Pegram’s
home. They said the same as the
doctor, that Bessie was touch and
go and may not live. They argued
that justice could only be served
for everyone if Bessie were given
a chance to say one way or another if L.Q. Ivy had done it.
Whether it was the force of the argument or the force of half a
dozen mob leaders in his living room at midnight, Judge
Pegram issued a writ ordering Sheriff Roberts to produce L.Q.
Ivy at the hospital for identification by Monday.
Sheriff Roberts saw the trap being set as clearly as you do.
So he moved to his next stratagem. Instead of waiting for Mon-
day when the mob would be waiting, he snuck L.Q. into town
on Sunday morning when nearly everyone was at church. L.Q.
was brought to Bessie’s hospital room with Judge Pegram and
her father as the only witnesses. 
Through swollen eyelids and lips, Bessie whispered, “I’m
not sure but he looks like the man.”
They’d been delayed that morning and by the time they
were coming out of the hospital, the churches were letting out
and a crowd was already gathering. With time running out,
Sheriff Roberts and his group all paused again in a hallway for
a conference before trying to leave the hospital.
Billy Preston and his boys blocked the Sheriff and his charge
on the hospital lawn. The small crowd was swelling with every
moment that passed. Somehow, word had already raced ahead
that L.Q. had been identified. Preston and one of his boys
demanded L.Q. be handed over. Judge Pegram tried to shout
him down but without much success.
Sheriff Roberts looked around, they were already sur-
rounded by a couple of hundred people that were closing in
quickly. He heaved a heavy sigh and pulled Preston close to
him, saying where few could hear him, “Not here, not now.
Not with the judge and the girl’s father here for the federals to
blame. I’m taking him to the jail. If you and enough of your
boys were to overpower us, well nobody could say we hadn’t
done all we could.” A big smile spread across Preston’s face.
He’d always known Sheriff Roberts was a practical man.
Just as Preston stepped aside to let the sheriff pass, Bessie’s
father started shouting to the crowd. He was standing back
behind them on the hospital steps. When he shouted, they all
turned back toward him, knowing he was about to justify their
plan and urge justice for his daughter. As the crowd turned,
Sheriff Roberts and his crew moved quickly and unobserved to
their car.
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A crowd 
gathered that
Friday night on
the courthouse
lawn.
2. The real-life mob members had so little of the fictional shame
shown by the characters in To Kill a Mockingbird that they proudly
posed for a group photograph with their victim.  You can see that
photograph in the archives of the Library of Congress at
https://bit.ly/2Cy0wPN and at https://bit.ly/2TmMs15.  The only
kernel of truth I can find in that fictional shame is that the story
What Mr. Gaines said sur-
prised the crowd. He told them
that Bessie was not sure about the
man. He asked them not to take
any hasty action. They did not
much care for that message. 
Meanwhile, Sheriff Roberts,
L.Q. Ivy, the Aberdeen Sheriff,
and a couple of deputies drove off
down the street. Billy Preston
glanced over his shoulder at the
retreating sound of the car just in
time to see them reach the end of the street and turn the wrong
way, they turned away from the jail and toward the river.
Preston shouted, “WE BEEN HAD BOYS, AFTER THEM.”
People scrambled to cars and set off in pursuit. But Sheriff
Roberts had a head start and he intended to make the most of
it. Sheriff Roberts raced across town toward the bridge over the
Tallahatchie River. It was the only way to cross that river for 30
miles in either direction. As he reached the bridge, he slowed
and dropped off two deputies with orders to delay their pur-
suers as long as they could. 
Sheriff Roberts sped off with L.Q. toward Holly Springs, a
majority African-American community to the north and birth-
place of legendary anti-lynching crusader Ida B. Wells. 
The deputies threw together a makeshift road block at the
bridge ahead of the mob. When those good citizens arrived,
guns were drawn and threats were made but the two deputies
were soon overwhelmed by sheer numbers. They never fired a
shot. Depending on my mood, some days I think they never
had a chance and sometimes I think that if they had just shot
one person it might have ended that mob. But we will never
know what might have happened, only what did happen.
The deputies had succeeded in stalling the mob and giving
Sheriff Roberts a little more time—but it wasn’t enough. Tele-
phones were pretty unusual in that area then, but there was
one close to the bridge. Someone saw what was happening and
called ahead to the next town, Myrtle. A few minutes later,
three cars left Myrtle, drove south a ways, and then set up to
block the road.
With the road blocked ahead and the mob closing in from
behind, Sheriff Roberts was out of tricks. The outcome looks
to have been inevitable at that point.
Once the mob took L.Q., they brought him back to that
temporary saw mill where L.Q.s nightmare had begun. They
stripped him, put him in chains, and then tortured him with a
blow torch as well as a set of lemon squeezers. By and by, the
17 year old was persuaded to recite a confession before a crowd
of several hundred. Sitting as a people’s court, the crowd pro-
nounced sentence and proceeded to the execution.
People think of lynching as a hanging, but by the early 20th
century, the mobs were much more sadistic. They found a
Model T axle and drove it into the ground as a giant stake.
They chained L.Q. to that stake, surrounding him with crate
wood doused with kerosene. Three men stepped forward from
the crowd and lit the pyre.
I suspect that the people reading this essay have to rely
entirely on imagination to hear the screams and experience the
smells of a person literally on fire. But my grandfather did not
need his imagination for these things. He was there. He had
been one of those deputies with Sheriff Roberts. He caught up
to the mob when the pyre was in full blaze. He would talk of
how that smell and those screams were still with him half a
century later. 
While he could still speak, L.Q. is said to have cried out,
“have mercy, I didn’t do it.”
My grandfather was barely literate, never held a book other
than a Bible. He had failed as a sharecropper. His working life
had been standing at the town square waiting for someone who
needed a day laborer. The family still says the best job he ever
had was working for a regular paycheck from the city cleaning
the streets of horse manure in the early 20s, the job that got
him hired as a deputy. One can imagine how the job of deputy
must have looked to a man like that. Less than two weeks on
the job, papaw turned in his badge the day after the lynching
and spent the rest of his life at that town square waiting for
work as a day laborer.
Most of this story, I have gotten from other sources. Papaw
would tell me little more than the scene at the sawmill and
how those smells and sounds still haunted him. He was a huge,
powerfully built man. He had a strong voice and, normally, was
such an optimistic person that he was always on the verge of
breaking into laughter. But when he told me about L.Q. Ivy, he
was flat and deflated. He would always say “there wasn’t any-
thing anybody could do to stop it…,” as his voice trailed off. 
I have always struggled with what to make of this story and
my grandfather’s role in it. As much as I loved and admired my
grandfather, at times I despised him for what I saw as his cow-
ardice. I knew him to be a man lacking in racial prejudice and
a man of boundless physical courage. I questioned why he 
didn’t do something more like shoot a member of that mob. It
was always easy for me to forget that the “mob” was made of
real people, people that were my grandfather’s friends and
neighbors just like Harper Lee’s mob members. If you reversed
perspectives on the humanity of the participants, would Scout
or Atticus really have shot Mr. Cunningham? In these moods,
I most resented the simplicity of To Kill a Mockingbird’s version
of the mob mentality. At other times, I recognized the likely
pointlessness of any additional actions I thought papaw could
have taken. If you know the history of the time, the best pos-
sible outcome of any action by him would have been replace-
ment of the mob lynching with a state-sanctioned hanging that
would have been every bit as much an injustice but would
have had the trappings of courtroom legality, just like the
result Atticus Finch ultimately delivered in To Kill a Mocking-
bird. Because, at the end of the day, the majority of people did
not believe in the rule of law at that time.2 They believed in
their tribe and promoting their tribe over any other. In a mood
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Sitting as a 
people’s court,
the crowd 
pronounced 
sentence and
proceeded to 
the execution. 
of L.Q. Ivy has always been told in white homes since the day after
it happened with L.Q. Ivy being innocent.  However, they also
have always told the story villainizing Bessie Gaines who was, as
an unwed mother, another of the social untouchables of the day.
While the storytellers accept that Bessie was the victim of some-
body’s brutal attack that day, they usually accuse one of her
rumored many boyfriends and suggest she likely deserved it for
her sinfulness.
recognizing this reality, I usually resented the people praising
Atticus Finch and forgetting who Tom Robbins was or the net
result on his fate. 
Given the time and his capabilities, maybe it was enough for
grandfather Prince to fight the mob as he did and, when he
failed, then to make what was a big sacrifice for him and his
family when he turned in that badge and refused to “be a part
of it.” Plenty of people today and through history have not
been willing to do even that much. Maybe, like Atticus Finch
and Scout, he did what he thought he could and felt the pain
of its inadequacy in the end. About all I truly know firsthand
is how that one day in his youth still haunted him at his end. 
The lesson I learned from grappling with how to feel about
my grandfather’s role in his world was that my time would be
better spent deciding what role I will play in my world. The
lesson for me from both L.Q. Ivy and Tom Robbins is that if
you wait until the lynch mob assembles (whether in the street
or in the trappings of a courtroom) and hope for one hero to
step forward and save the day, you have waited too long. The
rule of law is not gained by one brave person standing against
a community; the community itself must be the authority that
values the rule of law enough to impose it. That community
support for the rule of law is built laboriously through people
who, day in and day out, live its principles and persuade oth-
ers of its worth. More often that not, it can feel like the labor
of Sisyphus eternally pushing his rock. But, bit by bit, pebble
by pebble, isolated decision by isolated decision, that commu-
nity support for the rule of law can be coaxed to grow.
Today, the judiciary and community support for the value of
the rule of law are under challenge like never before in my life
time. In the half dozen discussions of judges I have seen in
high-profile national media during the last year, I have heard
much praise for the judge’s support of this tribe or that tribe
but the voices for fair and impartial administration of justice
seem to be little more than a whisper.
Happily, the rule of law is much stronger today than in the
lynching era. But some of the instinct that fueled that era
remains, that herd mentality to rush to a judgment and mete
out the herd’s vision of punishment immediately. Today, that
instinct is more likely to manifest itself as a Twitter barrage,
cable news screed of outrage, cyber attack, boycott, shut down
of a target, online petition, or firing—all on the bases of over-
heated rhetoric and rumor, done immediately, without bother-
ing to gather or weigh actual facts. Whether the herd member
today condemns the accused or the accuser in the latest media
sensation based on an investigation that never occurred and
non-existent objective standards of decision making, the long-
term victim is the rule of law.
We of today’s bench have taken on the mantle of stewards
for one of the greatest inheritances we could hope for, a com-
munity that valued the rule of law impartially applied. A big
part of our job is to preserve and strengthen that value, a
charge all the more important because it is under challenge
from all directions today. Sometimes we will pursue this charge
in our actions on the bench, sometimes in our words in the
community, and sometimes in our private behaviors. And, let’s
face it, some days we will step wrongfooted. Never forget that
the work you do today will echo down the years no matter how
small the individual act may seem to you at the moment—
make sure you do your best to design your legacy to strengthen
the rule of law. To all of you that labor professionally each and
every day to maintain the high standards of the rule of law and
promote by your work public appreciation for the rule of law,
thank you for me and thank you for the generations to come.
David Prince is a trial judge in Colorado, an
editor of Court Review, and a faculty member
for the National Judicial College. He is also a
contributor to a community storytelling pro-
gram known as The Story Project. Your com-
ments on this story are welcome at
david.prince@judicial.state.co.us 
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A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
The State of State Courts 2018
National Center for State Courts,
https://bit.ly/2V54eYJ
The State of State Courts, produced by
the National Center for State Courts and
discussed by Pres. Torres in his column
for this issue, can be found at
https://bit.ly/2V54eYJ. NCSC includes a
handy six-page summary of the results, as
well as presentation slides for those of
you educating the community. As always,
the annual survey contains some intrigu-
ing information and excellent materials. 
Listen > Learn > Lead:  A Guide to
Improving Court Services Through
User-Centered Design
Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System,
https://bit.ly/2FD10F0 
In reviewing our courthouse systems or
building new systems for a new program,
we are frequently told to obtain stake-
holder input. But, how many of us really
know how to go about gathering and
reviewing such feedback in a practical yet
comprehensive way?  
IAALS has an ongoing program called
Court Compass that explores ways to
make court systems for divorce more
user-friendly and accessible. In pursuing
this mission, Court Compass had devel-
oped a system for obtaining feedback
from stakeholders in the systems ranging
from self-represented litigants to inside
and outside system professionals. The
call it the Design Spring Process. They
believe they have developed an excellent
system for gathering useful stakeholder
feedback that would apply to a wide vari-
ety of projects. The good news for us is
that they have decided to share in this
handy guide.
Judea Pearl and Dana MacKenzie, 
The Book of Why, the New Sicence of
Cause and Effect 
Basic Books, 2018. 432 pp. ($32)
Judges, like researchers, routinely evalu-
ate causation, always searching for the
dividing line between correlation and
causation. We do so daily in the most
simplistic case ranging to the staggeringly
complex. In The Book of Why, Prof. Pearl
brings insight and analytical integrity to
approaching a question of causation.
While the book is written with the
researcher in mind and can bog down in
some dense language now and then, it is
overall an enjoyable and illuminating
read for anyone in the decision-making
business.  Prof. Pearl explains a multi-
runged, ladder-of-causation framework.
Possibly of most importance to us, Prof.
Pearl helps explain what data can and
cannot actually tell us. While the insights
in this book will help you in your gate-
keeper role for scientific evidence, it will
also help you bring a new rigor and valid-
ity to your own causation analyses. 
APA Guidelines for Psychological Prac-
tice with Boys and Men: August 2018
American Psychological Association,
https://bit.ly/2D0EQww 
Judges are frequently required to provide
some guidance, oversight, or evaluation
of a litigant’s psychological treatment or
of treatment programs. Most of us have
been poorly equipped to play this role.
One option for expanding my under-
standing of the practice side of treatment
programs has been reading the bevy of
thoughtful media pieces discussing the
APA’s recent release of guidelines for
treatment of boys and men. On first
blush, this sounds disturbing to our “fair
and impartial” mindsets to segregate out
males for special treatment. However, the
latest set of treatment guidelines follow
earlier guidelines released relating to
females and LGBTQ. The guidelines and
some of the discussion of those guide-
lines are enlightening regarding the par-
ticular challenges associated with treating
these groups. Reviewing the discussion
and the guidelines may just help you
evaluate that next treatment methodol-
ogy argument you hear in your court-
room. One accessible write-up of the
issues can be found in The Atlantic at
https://bit.ly/2QBv3jZ.
The Resource Page
g
